Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2018

Learning to Live and Love Virtuously
Henry DeRuff

Recommended Citation
DeRuff, Henry, "Learning to Live and Love Virtuously" (2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1880.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1880

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Claremont McKenna College

Learning to Live and Love Virtuously

submitted to
Professor Paul Hurley

by
Henry DeRuff

for
Senior Thesis
Spring 2018
April 23rd, 2018

Abstract
John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant authored two of the most famous pieces of work in
ethical theory (Utilitarianism and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, respectively),
yet both fail for various reasons to give us direction by way of living good lives. This thesis
begins by outlining those shortcomings, before offering Aristotelian virtue ethics as the
solution. Virtue ethics, as conceived by Aristotle, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Julia Annas,
delineates a process – grounded in our real lives – by which we may improve as people and
therefore flourish, or live good, moral lives: the habituation of the virtues. Importantly,
virtue ethics is a process, (not a set of outcomes) and is teachable, which distinguishes it
from the other two theories. In developing the virtues, we are able to discover goods
internal to the practices that define our lives, whether those are our work, our school, our
relationships, or something else entirely. Furthermore, the virtue-ethical approach helps us
learn from and grow in our emotional lives, as opposed to casting emotions aside as a
skewing force contrary to morality. Virtue, as I will show, lays the groundwork for love,
and therefore for flourishing relationships across our lives. In the final chapter, I examine
a place where virtue and virtuous love are effectively taught and embraced: Camp Lanakila,
in Fairlee, VT. I conclude by offering some takeaways from Lanakila that we may
incorporate in our schools, our places of work and worship, our families, and our lives.
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Introduction
Convenience pervades our modern lives. When we want a book or a pair of noisecancelling headphones, we can order them on Amazon, and they will arrive within days at
our doorstep. If we want to get somewhere but do not have a car, we can call a Lyft or an
Uber, and one will be there to whisk us wherever we please. If we are hungry but do not
want to cook, and also do not want to go to a restaurant, DoorDash and UberEats promise
essentially whatever food we want, delivered to our door as quickly as possible. Almost
any song in the world is available via a quick search of whichever music streaming service
we prefer, and more and more, we don’t even have to use our hands to do this, as our
technology understands voice commands. Other forms of entertainment, like television
shows and video games, can be accessed more easily online than ever before. More and
more employers offer remote jobs, where we need never leave our houses or apartments to
go to work. Perhaps most notably, our social lives have been made considerably more
convenient by the advent of social media. When we want to interact, all of our friends are
instantaneously available by way of Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat. We do not even
need to speak to another person – we can text or dictate and have our phones transcribe for
us what we want to say. If we do not want to interact with other people, we almost never
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have to. In so many words, convenience has entered into our lives further than ever before,
and as a result, those lives are so much easier.
What is more, leisure is much more widely accessible than it has ever been. “What
makes today different [from the past, when there was a distinct leisure class] is the fact that
so much high-quality leisure activity can be accessed by all at low average cost and nearzero marginal cost.” 1 So, there may also be equity benefits to the increase of convenience,
in that it allows people all over the socioeconomic spectrum to access entertainment and
socializing at the touch of a button, or the sound of their voice. More people can add their
voice to political debates, organize for social justice, and meet likeminded people than ever
before. The benefits of convenience are many, and perhaps more equitable than previous
advances have been.
In a recent editorial for the New York Times, Tim Wu mused on the impacts of
convenience on our lives. He wrote about the way that convenience makes choices we
might have once considered straightforward and rational seem outlandish. 2 There are many
examples of this: cars have made buggies seem ridiculous; the internet has outmoded the
physical encyclopedia (as well as so many other things); Toys ‘R’ Us recently announced
its closing, 3 as Amazon, Walmart, and Target have shown us that we can do all our
shopping (from toys to groceries to clothes) in one place, often online. Convenience has
wholly changed the ways we go about our lives, for better or for worse. Because it has

1

Mokyr, Vickers, and Ziebarth, “The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth:
Is This Time Different?” 44.
2
Tim Wu, "The Tyranny of Convenience," The New York Times, February 16, 2018, accessed April 18,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/opinion/sunday/tyranny-convenience.html.
3
Chris Isidore, Jackie Wattles, and Parija Kavilanz, "Toys 'R' Us Will Close or Sell All US Stores,"
CNNMoney, accessed April 20, 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/news/companies/toys-r-us-closingstores/index.html.

10

DeRuff

made almost everything easier, it has made us challenge-averse – if something takes work
and there is a convenient alternative, we will almost surely take the alternative, and this
has its cost, Wu says:
Today’s cult of convenience fails to acknowledge that difficulty is a
constitutive feature of human experience. Convenience is all destination and
no journey. But climbing a mountain is different from taking the tram to the
top, even if you end up at the same place. We are becoming people who
care mainly or only about outcomes. We are at risk of making most of our
life experiences a series of trolley rides. 4
In accepting convenience into our lives unflinchingly, Wu argues, we endanger meaning. 5
The solution, he writes, is to “embrace the inconvenient – not always, but more of the
time.” 6 If we do not, we will, as he suggests, lose sight of the work necessary to find
meaning in our relationships and daily activities, in the name of “better” outcomes.
Convenience can be wonderful. We can connect with friends we haven’t seen in
years, even if they are across the world. We can even book a flight to go visit them in a
matter of minutes. But, in doing so, we must remember that convenience is a tool and not
a solution, that while it makes contact between us (no matter how far away we are) easier,
what we do with that contact, especially once we are up close, is what has the potential to
bestow real meaning on our lives. If we fly across the world to see our friends and simply
embracing the convenience of our phones, we will be no better off than if we had not made
the trip at all; in fact, we will probably be worse off.
“Sometimes,” Wu writes, “struggle is a solution. It can be the solution to the
question of who you are.” 7 Now more than ever, as convenience has reached what seems

4

Ibid.
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
5
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like an all-time high, we need to learn to be embrace the challenging, inconvenient
struggles that give our lives meaning. Per Wu:
Embracing inconvenience may sound odd, but we already do it without
thinking of it as such. As if to mask the issue, we give other names to our
inconvenient choices: We call them hobbies, avocations, callings, passions.
These are the noninstrumental activities that help to define us. They reward
us with character because they involve an encounter with meaningful
resistance — with nature’s laws, with the limits of our own bodies — as in
carving wood, melding raw ingredients, fixing a broken appliance, writing
code, timing waves or facing the point when the runner’s legs and lungs
begin to rebel against him. 8
These activities and relationships are what build our character, but only if we know how to
approach them. It is the goal of this thesis to identify and elucidate an ethical theory which
does exactly that.

~

This thesis seeks to answer several questions. How can we live good lives? Is there
a particular ethical theory that will allow us to do so? Is that theory applicable to our lives
or is it an unreachable ideal? Is it congruent with what we believe about human nature and
how human nature should be? Does it allow some influence of our emotional selves or is
it purely rational? Is it teachable to the next generation? In examining three ethical theories,
I attempt to answer these questions (and others) about each of them.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I focus on two of the prominent ethical theories:
utilitarian and Kantian ethics. While each has unique, intuitive appeal, both are ultimately
insufficient to help us lead good lives, in large part due to the alienation they induce

8

Ibid.
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between our rational selves and our emotional selves. Moreover, neither is teachable,
making it difficult to understand how they can persistently promote the good.
The second chapter looks at an ethical theory that purports to solve this issue. Virtue
ethics, from Aristotle through contemporaries such as MacIntyre and Annas, is an ethical
theory that focuses on specific characteristics, called the virtues, which we learn through
habituation. We become more virtuously capable people through practices and a constant
effort of striving toward the good, always pushing ourselves further. When we participate
in a practice virtuously, we enter into relationship with other practitioners, past and present,
as well as our mentors and mentees in that practice. Each of us begins at a different moral
starting point, and the nature of practices and the discovery of internal goods is such that
any of us can access them, thus allowing us to improve upon ourselves and upon the
traditions to which we have been exposed, regardless of our origin or identity. All three
authors, and especially Annas, underscore the importance of a good teacher. Annas argues
that the teacher is essential to help the student 9 understand the reasons why something is
virtuous; understanding the student and their environment is critical to get them pointed in
the virtuous direction, and to help them through the practice. What is unique about virtue
ethics is that the right thing to do often overlaps with what a person wants to do, because
the virtuous person enjoys doing the right thing. Internal goods make it so; these are the
greatest goods to which we have access, and they fundamentally change the way we think
about the world, so that the right thing to do is also what we genuinely prefer to do. In
living virtuously, we discover goods internal to practices, and seek to improve and grow
as people. In so doing, we flourish. Importantly, virtue ethics is about a process, and not a

9

I use the words “teacher” and “student” here loosely, not in the purely academic sense.
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specific outcome; this differentiates it particularly from utilitarianism. Thus, the chapter
concludes: virtue ethics is the ethical theory that best answers the above questions.
The third chapter examines love, our strongest positive emotion. In this chapter, I
demonstrate the necessity of structuring love of any kind – romantic, platonic, familial,
self-oriented, occupational or vocational, practical, and radical – with virtue; only love
structured as such will lead to the lasting flourishing for which we as humans strive.
Virtuous love across our lives is a key part of what gives us meaning, and when we develop
a virtuous, loving outlook, that forms a positive feedback loop between love and virtues,
wherein one strengthens the other and vice versa. When we do this, we flourish in the most
brilliant way imaginable.
The fourth chapter is an ethnographic case study on a place where the virtues and
virtuous love are effectively taught: Camp Lanakila, in Fairlee, Vermont. Lanakila is a
place that emphasizes the internal goods that come from embracing close relationships and
challenging practices. It is a place that asks each camper and counselor to bring their
genuine selves, yet also reach for their best, most virtuous, most loving selves, and
celebrates doing so. Lanakila is a model institution for the teaching and learning of the
virtues and of virtuous love.
I conclude with an exploration of what makes Lanakila effective at inculcating
these life lessons, and some takeaway points that may be helpful for other institutions, from
the family and the school to the workplace and even our online communities. In a world
that grows more convenient by the day, it is easy to focus on outcomes, and particularly
the ones that are readily available, for which we do not have to work. But if we are to grow
and flourish as people and as a people, then we need to shift our focus, as Tim Wu has

14

DeRuff

suggested. In our families, our schools, our places of work and worship, and even online,
we need to focus on goods internal to whichever practices we participate in, and on the
virtues that make those internal goods possible. This will require considerably more
communication and consistency between the different spheres. If we are able to find that
focus consistently across the different arenas of our lives, we will be able to take on and
even thrive in the inconvenient, find meaning in our lives, our work, and our relationships
with those around us, and flourish.

1
I.

Why Mill and Kant Can’t Help Us Flourish
How Can We Learn to Live Good Lives?
I’ll begin with a pretty uncontroversial statement: most people want to live a good

life. The controversy, especially among philosophers, rests in the follow-up question to
that statement, which asks: how can someone do that? Humans have hugely varying ideas
of what, to them, a good life will entail, and how to live one, and often have strong opinions
on the topic. Some people long for financial success, others for stimulating and rewarding
careers, and still more for fulfilling personal relationships. Are any of these right or wrong?
While many of us would not want to be moralizing and tell people to their faces that they
are wrong, we often say these sorts of things behind others’ backs. Furthermore, it is
becoming increasingly easy to pass public judgment over the internet, whether through
social media or public fora, as well as through traditional news sources, in their opinion
pages and, more often, on their front pages as well. However, the way in which we tell
others that they are wrong is beside the point. What is salient here is that, regardless of
what we think is acceptable to share, we each tend to have strong opinions about what is
right and what is wrong, especially when it comes to lives other than our own. Philosophers
are no exception – that is exactly why the field of ethics was created. In this chapter, I will
examine two of the most prominent ethical theories to see what merits each may have for
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helping us to live good lives. I am also interested in the way that these theories connect
with people. Are they unachievably high standards that no human could realistically reach?
Or, are they excessively broad, unable to give us meaningful direction in how to live good
or moral lives? Do they connect to us not only as rational but also emotional beings, giving
us good reason to follow them even when it is against our immediate interests to do so?
Finally, can they be effectively taught?
I begin with classical utilitarianism, which at first glance seems to give us incredible
flexibility – it allows for the pursuit of all three of the examples from the prior paragraph,
as “utility-maximizing” activities – but which also creates a difficult gap between what is
individually rational (what maximizes one’s own utility) and what is moral (what
maximizes the utility of the collective). This high moral standard struggles to connect with
people and ultimately is alienating. I then look at Kantian ethics, which sets an attractive
and widely agreed-upon ideal, but also struggles to connect with the individual, in terms
of the reasons it gives for following it as well as in the way it can be taught. At the end of
the chapter, I conclude that if one wishes to inculcate utilitarian or Kantian moral theories,
they will essentially default into virtue ethics.

II.

In the Pursuit of Utility, but Whose?
The central concept of utilitarianism is a compelling one. That our morality is just

what serves the greatest overall happiness seems intuitive; if we’re being moral, why would
we want to do anything but make the greatest number of people happy? It obviously follows
that two people being happy is better than one person being happy, and better yet if seven
billion people are happy, right? Is anything wrong with this picture? At first glance, it does
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not seem like it. Eminent intellectuals like John Stuart Mill and Peter Singer have made
strong arguments in favor of this view. After reading Singer, one might even wonder why
they haven’t been working on behalf of the greatest overall good all along. After all, there
are many people who are starving, or whose communities have been ravaged by war, all
around the world. There is misery and pain and suffering, and we, especially in wealthy,
developed countries, with all the resources available to us, ought to help those people with
the resources we have. 10 We have all seen advertisements imploring us to donate some
nominal amount to feed a family for a week or send a child to school for a year or buy
vaccines for a village, and why shouldn’t we do these things? Our money will go much
further spent on any of these causes than the same amount spent on, say, a fancy meal at a
restaurant. Better yet, to truly have an impact, why don’t we use our resources to go,
ourselves, to one of these communities in need and give our time in addition to our money
– after all, if we all did this, it seems almost certain that the massive resources of the
wealthy would be able to dramatically alter the outcomes of nearly everyone in the world. 11
That sounds wonderful, does it not? A world without economic suffering, with the ability
to respond to natural disaster because of the rapid mobilization of resources possible when
we all commit ourselves to the greatest overall happiness is the classical utilitarian ideal.
This is the world Peter Singer imagines, where each of us is willing to spend ourselves
down to subsistence to better the lives of others. This is also the world to which classical
utilitarian morality commits us. And it leaves us with a simple question: why not?

10

Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972):
235, February 1, 2010, accessed January 27, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052.
11
Ibid.
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Just as easily as utilitarianism provides us with the moral imperative to take actions
that enhance the greatest overall happiness, it gives us strong reasons not to do so. The
driving belief of utilitarian rationality is that each person takes the actions that will bring
about the greatest amount of utility, or happiness, for themselves. 12 So, while someone in
another place might very well be starving, poorly educated, dying from disease, that fancy
dinner is so much more immediate, and it will bring such wonder to one’s taste buds – how
could someone say no? At the same time, if the person in question derives utility from
helping out that person in need, they very well might do so! Maybe it is even the case that
this person derives utility from the sense that they are acting morally. After all, every
human is different, and utilitarian thought recognizes that each of us has different
motivations for acting in any given scenario; we will do the action that we believe will give
us the most utility, even if that means giving someone else happiness (or food, education,
or vaccines). There is nothing, however, about the utilitarian conception of morality that
necessitates that we direct our own utility maximization one way or another; there is no
compulsory normative device to direct our actions. So, whether we want to help others,
ourselves, or some combination of both, utilitarianism holds that whatever gives us utility
is what it is rational to do. Humans, after all, have direct access to just one viewpoint: our
own. With that as our perspective of the world, how could we be expected to make
decisions from any other? We feel our emotions directly, our wants, desires, sadness, anger,
and fears, and it is from these feelings and a desire to maximize the good ones that we act.
Because of its flexibility for each person, classical utilitarianism seems to offer the
remarkable luxury of moral relativism. Anyone who buys into this mode of thought is able

12

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2001), 6.
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to say, “Hey! In that part of the world 13, what gives them utility is different than what gives
me utility, and that’s okay!” Classical utilitarians thus appear able to take a dramatically
progressive stance on different cultures, a benefit which lends itself to the flexibility of this
mode of philosophy. However, it is unclear that classical utilitarians could ever truly label
something as irrational, even if they believe that it is fundamentally wrong or to the great
detriment of the greatest overall happiness. They are committed to saying that the pursuit
of whatever brings a person utility must be rational for that person, thus potentially creating
a deep divide between what is individually rational and what is moral, depending on a
given person’s inclinations. While utilitarians (especially John Stuart Mill and Peter
Singer) endorse the greatest overall happiness theory of morality, they must respect that
each person rationally acts to enhance their own utility, and thus has no truly compelling
reason to consider the greater good, unless it falls within their preferences. With regard to
that greater good, Mill writes: “As between his own happiness and that of others,
utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent
spectator.” 14 This seems a far cry from utilitarianism’s deep commitment to individual
rationality. Clearly, something must be done to bridge this gap.
In order to approach the utilitarian ideal, Mill proposes the idea of educational and
other social institutions as the solution. Said institutions must be structured so as to bring
individual and collective utility into line with each other in each person’s mind:
As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would
enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness
or (as, speaking practically, it may be called) the interest of every individual
as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and
secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over
13
14

Or: “In that community,” or “In that family,” etc.
Mill, Utilitarianism, 17.
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human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of
every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and
the good of the whole, especially between his own happiness and the
practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the
universal happiness prescribes, so that not only he may be unable to
conceive of the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with
conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to
promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual
motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large
and prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence. 15
This passage and the connection it creates between individual and collective utility raise
two particularly compelling questions, upon which I have begun to touch above.
First, if our individual utility tells us to do what is best or will create the most
happiness for us, what incentive, aside from other-regarding preferences, do we have to set
up our institutions in that way? Surely it makes sense, according to the utilitarian logic
behind the prisoner’s dilemma, to want everyone else to benefit the greatest overall good
and to free ride off of the actions of others? But, as with the prisoner’s dilemma, if everyone
acts this way, it is of course mutually defeating, and there is no way for the social
institutions Mill mentions to get towards his conception of morality. However, as
mentioned above, utilitarians may use other-regarding preferences to solve this issue. Even
then, how can we be sure that most, or even some, people will take into account this type
of preferences? If they are just preferences, they cannot be mandated one way or another;
you cannot just tell someone what to prefer and what not to prefer, because whatever it is
that they prefer, it will be rational for them to pursue. But if they are also the basis for our
action, which Mill (and Singer) argues that they are, then it is unclear that our social and
educational institutions will come to be set up such that they realign our interests towards

15

Ibid, 17.
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the greatest overall happiness. Is it not more likely that, on this account of rationality, the
principles agreed upon will be those held by whoever is designing or holding power in
these institutions? Furthermore, what happens if the designers or the powerful
fundamentally disagree? Disagreement happens all the time at all levels of decisionmaking, from the household to the government. If two people or groups disagree such that
their views cannot coexist (for example, one group believes that it would be most beneficial
to overall utility to enslave or annihilate the other 16), how might we aggregate their
preferences to serve the greatest overall utility? Utilitarians are not able, then, to take such
a progressive approach after all. In this situation, Mill and other utilitarians must reach
beyond their typical toolbox into the realm of virtue ethics or objectivist theories of
morality, if they are to successfully teach other-regarding preferences, but more on that
later.
A second question follows the first: is Mill’s ideal of enjoining individual and
overall utility even desirable? If everyone is always acting on behalf of the greatest overall
utility, is it possible to pursue one’s own ends at all? Mill would likely respond that in his
ideal, our individual ends are simply those of the collective – there is no separation – and
in this sense he almost seems to harken forward in time to the Marxist species-being. He
would argue that the goal is to reach a point where we genuinely desire just to benefit the
greater good. 17 Yet this implication strikes me as incredibly off-putting and misses a key
part of what it is to be human – to understand what will make oneself or others around
oneself happy and to pursue that, at least within the constraints of what one feels to be

16

This, of course, has serious real-world corollaries, both past and present – surely, we want to condemn
such actions!
17
Mill, Utilitarianism, 17.
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right. Let us consider an example that will help to show the misalignment of utilitarian
morality with the way any of us actually want to live.
A question we often hear in business or political negotiation is: “What will my
company/constituents get out of this?” It seems a rational or reasonable enough line – after
all, if a business is profit-maximizing, or a politician seeks to benefit their constituents,
which most businesses are, and most politicians do, isn’t that the exact question they should
be asking? It may be, 18 but it strikes me as definitively wrong to think this way in our
personal interactions with others. When we enter into committed relationships, if the
question we ask ourselves is just what we will get out of it, we are looking at it the wrong
way. We favor the outcome over the process. What if there are diminishing returns on the
relationship? Do we simply ask our partner to increase output, or do we opt out the second
our utility begins to dip? On the other hand, if we take the utilitarian moral approach, and
ask what is best for the greatest overall good, we remove the human connection inherent
in the relationship. If this is how we see relationships, then we have set ourselves up for a
dystopian future where our partnerships only exist insofar as they are useful to the greater
society.
Considering interpersonal relationships from either the individual or social
utilitarian perspective prohibits any sort of truly meaningful relationship that we might
have, as each decision becomes a cold and disconnected moral calculus. As Peter Railton
eloquently points out in “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,”

18

It may also not be. Patagonia is an excellent example of a company which consistently asks what is best
not only for their bottom line but also for the environment, for its communities, from supply chain to
consumer, for nonprofit partners, for social and environmental justice and for threatened indigenous groups
(see bibliography for examples).
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there is something distinctively off-putting about the husband who takes care of his wife
when she is sick simply because “it is the right thing to do,” (this could be reinterpreted as
“it is the utility-maximizing thing to do”) and not because he loves her. 19 Certainly, there
is a place for morality in relationships, 20 but our emotions seem to ask for more. That two
people should be together because they will be enhancing the greatest overall utility,
whether on average or absolutely,

21

misses the point of why two people enter into a

committed relationship to begin with: that they love each other. Before exploring this point
too deeply, I shall offer some interim conclusions on utilitarianism and then consider
another ethical theory that perhaps holds some of the solutions to the utilitarianism’s issues.
As we have seen, utilitarianism has many intuitive strengths and weaknesses. It
seems perfectly natural to say that each of us should pursue what makes us happy, or gives
us utility, whether that is contributing to another’s happiness or going surfing. However,
this leaves open the obvious gap of what to do if that which gives us utility harms another.
To address this, Mill offers an account of morality built upon the greatest overall utility,
which essentially asks the question: “what will bring the most good to the greatest number
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of people?” In doing so, Mill creates a divide between what is individually rational and
what is good – in outlining what is good for the whole of society, he so constricts what is
rational for a given person (i.e. in their self-interest), so as to nearly eliminate that from the
moral ideal entirely. 22 To fully separate morality and rationality is antithetical to the point
of morality: to live good lives. There must be some overlap between the two; otherwise we
would struggle to have good reason to be moral, or teach others to be truly moral, and not
just to do what is in our own interest. Mill’s solution, of using social and educational
institutions, will come back to bear on the answer to this divide, though not in the way he
invokes it.
Before delving into education, we will look at Kant, who presents morality as the
ultimate manifestation of rationality, or pure, practical reason. For Kant, morality comes
about not as a set of utilitarian preferences (and therefore not entirely dependent on
outcomes), nor as something that is influenced by our emotions, “passions,” 23 or
“inclinations,” 24 but as actions based on the universal imperative, which forms our
objective duty to others as humans. Unlike utilitarianism, Kantian morality is totally
independent of what we happen to prefer in any given scenario because it comes from an
objective, unchanging standard. As a result, it is free from many critiques of utilitarianism,
but, as we will see, runs into its own set of obstacles, and, in the end, has a similar issue
with alienation as utilitarianism does.
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Acting from Duty: Possible on the Playground?
As a child, I heard the Golden Rule over and over: “Do unto others as you would

have them do unto you.” 25 This always seemed like a good rule to me – in fact, fairness
was so important to me that I often argued for it vehemently on the playground when my
friends and I would decide teams for sports. For example, if the best player in our grade
was one of the captains, I felt that the next best player should be the other captain, so they
could not choose each other and demolish the other team. To me, doing so felt antithetical
to the activity at hand – did fun and competition not diminish on either side when the teams
were so heavily stacked one way? What I longed for at the time was the consideration of
an impartial rule for deciding teams, something like Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance 26: I wanted
the better players to take themselves out of the situation for a moment and consider what
decision they might make if they were not the best, or even did not know where their skill
level might fall. Of course, this is not how the interaction would normally go down. The
best players would often choose each other, and I, along with the other mediocre players
on the court or the field, would lose by wide margins, unless we were on the same team as
the two best players, in which case we would usually not touch the ball much at all.
Though of course I did not know this at the time, what I hoped for in terms of
fairness from my classmates, which I above called an invocation of Rawls, was treatment
as a member of a Kantian community of ends. I wanted to be treated by my classmates how
I thought they would want to be treated if the roles were reversed. 27 According to Kant, all
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of morality can be distilled down to a simple rule, which he calls the categorical imperative.
Effectively, what the categorical imperative calls for is this: I may pursue my ends insofar
as they do not encroach on anyone else’s ends (which I must recognize they have a
legitimate right to pursue equal to my own); therefore, I may not treat anyone else as a
means to my ends. 28 In less jargon-heavy terms, this means that my actions must be
universalizable; they cannot be exclusive of everyone else taking those same actions, nor
can those actions treat anyone as merely useful and not another person worthy of dignity
and respect. For example, I cannot litter, for if everyone littered, our world would be
covered in trash and unlivable for everyone. Furthermore, I am using whoever cleans up
after me and whomever is inconvenienced or even harmed by my actions as a means to my
ends, since I take for granted the fact that I cause extra work for them. Per the Kantian
standard, nothing I do can be an exception to how all humans should be allowed to act.
Kant is resolute and steadfast in this rule: “Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold
morally, i.e. as the ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity.” 29 Such
a law must be based not in “the nature of the human being, or in the circumstances of the
world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason.” 30 In other
words, what is good must be good independent of the cultural or situational value we assign
it in different parts of the world or in different times throughout history. Unlike Mill, Kant
makes no presumption of moral relativism; in fact, he would be abhorred at the idea.

not to say that it is not a good ideal. It certainly is, but as this thesis will show, it is alienating and difficult to
absorb without some measure of character development, as well as a genuine love of every other person.
28
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The categorical imperative is a simple rule, and it makes a lot of logical sense. It
seems easy enough to ask how I can justify doing something if I could not justify my friend
doing the same thing back to me. Kant’s categorical imperative is fair and treats everyone
exactly alike, much the way the United States’ founding documents hope to do.31 It also
fulfills key lessons that many of us were taught as children about respect and responsibility
to others, such as the Golden Rule. Applied to the above example, it is easy to see how the
categorical imperative would make for a better scenario, in which there would be more
balanced competition, fewer hurt feelings (on my part!), and fairer teams. One possible
solution using might be that two roughly equivalent players skill-wise would pick the
teams, agreeing ahead of time on the rules for doing so and dividing skill evenly, allowing
for equality of opportunity for each team. There could be many different ways to do this,
but the point is that whichever rule is used to divide the teams should be agreed upon ahead
of time and should allow for equality of opportunity to begin the game. After setting the
teams, they could compete as usual, and while one team would still beat the other, it is
much more likely that the competition will be fair and fun for all this way.
Returning to our example, imagine now that a teacher comes out to the playground,
and notices that a child is upset about the teams. If this teacher wants to deploy the Kantian
educational method, they would emphasize rule-following in accordance with the universal
maxim; to this end, Kant writes, “Character consists in readiness to act in accordance with
‘maxims.’” 32 The rule is the most important thing, and requires strict adherence in all
situations. According to Kant, if this teacher is doing their job well, they will use this
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opportunity to instruct how one might adapt the categorical imperative in this situation;
“having once made a rule they must always follow it.” 33 After teaching this maxim once,
and taking every opportunity to reinforce it without any wiggle room, the teacher, Kant
says, will have effectively instructed the children on the playground in the development of
their good character. 34 In the case of moral transgression, the teacher must punish the
children, so that if they continue to make teams in such an unfair manner, they will learn
that this is unacceptable and that they have a duty to treat each other fairly, according to
the categorical imperative. 35 On the part of the children, Kant believes that this
methodology will help to inculcate in them an important obedience, and will teach them
not to act from inclination, which (he says) would encourage to make up the teams however
they see fit, but rather from duty to each other, which will guide them towards the right
decision consistently. 36 When they make the right decision, that is, the one in line with
their duty to others and themselves as ends, they are building character, Kant says. 37 In this
process, however, Kant emphasizes that the child will likely not understand duty as such
from the outset; at first, what is important for Kant is that the child has the maxim repeated
to them over and over again. 38 If the maxim is repeated, Kant believes that the child will
eventually begin to act in accordance with the categorical imperative. This pedagogy of
repetition poses a problem for Kant to which I will return after a brief elaboration on two
relevant aspects of his theory: the good will and duty.

33

Ibid, 85.
Ibid, 85.
35
Ibid, 85.
36
Ibid, 86-87.
37
Ibid, 85.
38
Ibid, 86-87.
34

Chapter 1

29

At this point, I will examine the sources of the categorical imperative and how it
comes to be a genuine form of morality. As I have noted, Kant argues that morality (or the
determination of what is good and how to act) must not rely in any sense on experience,
circumstances, time, culture, or anything that can change over time, but rather must come
from pure reason and be impervious to all the above forces. 39 So how then, can morality
arise, if not from experience or circumstances? Where exactly does morality come from?
For Kant, morality begins with the good will. 40 The good will cannot be a “talent
of the mind,” such as “understanding, wit, [or] judgment,” nor a “quality of the
temperament,” like “confidence, resolve, and persistency of intent”; the good will cannot
be any “gift of nature,” as the above are, no sooner than it could be a “gift of fortune,” such
as “power, riches, honor, [or] even health.” 41 The good will must be good without
qualification, must be incorruptible; each of the above characteristics are inherently
corruptible. 42 Understanding, wit, or judgment may each be used to take advantage of
others; confidence, resolve, and persistency of intent may be used in the pursuit of evil
ends; power, riches, honor, or health may be abused to elevate oneself unfairly above
others. On the other hand, some of these might be useful towards building the good will in
someone, but are only good insofar as they do so, or are expressed as a result of that good
will, and not for any intrinsic reason. 43 The person of good will exercises all of these things
in moderation, so that they may regulate their actions along the basis of the categorical

39

Kant, Groundwork, 5.
Ibid, 9.
41
Ibid, 9.
42
Ibid, 9.
43
Ibid, 9.
40

30

DeRuff

imperative. 44 This moderation can also be thought of as reason, which allows us to parse
for and put into practice exactly what a good will is: namely that which is “good, not for
other purposes as a means, but good in itself.” 45 Our reason, Kant argues, leads us to the
concept of duty.
Duty is something that we ought to do, i.e. what the categorical imperative
dictates. 46 Kant distinguishes acting from duty from acting in conformity with duty, as the
latter entails doing what duty requires solely because one knows that that is what duty
requires, or for any other non-intrinsic reason (for example, out of fear or inclination). 47
For example, if a person follows the rules because it is in their best interest to do so (even
if the rules dictate that this person must treat everyone equally as ends), then that person is
acting merely in conformity with duty and not genuinely from duty. The person who truly
acts from duty does so regardless of what reasons they have to do so. 48 So if it is no longer
in the aforementioned person’s best interest to act in accordance with the rules about
treating others as ends, acting from duty requires them to continue to do so anyway. It is at
this point that I wish to pose two related questions.
First, how does this duty that we are taught as children go from a rule we follow
without genuinely understanding it to one which we understand by reason? Second, how
is it that we come to learn the practical reason which we may use to evaluate for ourselves
how to act from duty and not simply in accordance with it? These questions, I believe,
point to the first flaw in Kant’s argument. If the only mechanism by which he proposes to
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teach duty is repetition, then the way in which people act will only ever be repetitive –
there will be no moral worth to their actions, along his own definition, because people
acting in such a way will be doing so merely in accordance with duty. It is unclear how
repetition can help people learn and come to understand the reasons underlying duty and
incorporate those genuinely into their actions. Kant wants people to act from duty but only
offers a mechanism for acting in conformity with it. It is my contention that if teachers
want to inculcate the categorical imperative in their pupils, then they must build their pupils
up to that point. This leads into my second (forthcoming) critique of Kant’s framework:
repetition of a rule that is unreachable from one’s current state is alienating; rather, a
teacher must guide their students to that rule by helping the students understand the reasons
for doing so.
This second issue for Kant is similar to one facing utilitarian morality: the
categorical imperative is alienating. Going back to the playground, if the teacher simply
repeats for her pupils the rule by which they must act, she will go on repeating forever.
Much more likely that the teacher is met with rolled eyes from their students than with a
genuine understanding of why the rule exists and how to apply it across differing scenarios.
What if the two best players turn to the teacher and ask why they should follow this rule,
if they are much better-off constructing the teams as they see fit and crushing their
competition? How can the teacher respond to this? Surely, repeating the categorical
imperative will not inspire genuine understanding. I posit that in repeating the rule as a
universal, unbending maxim,49 the teacher makes it vanishingly difficult to act from duty,
as opposed to solely in accordance with it. It is not enough to tell a student, especially a

49

Kant, Education, 84-85.

32

DeRuff

young one, that another human being deserves a certain treatment just by virtue of the fact
that they are a human being. They must learn the reasons why they should treat others as
ends in themselves through iterated interactions and experience, and must be helped to the
realization that pursuing their own ends is only morally legitimate if they simultaneously
allow others to pursue their ends as well. Kant cannot provide for this; neither character
nor reason appear in children without deeper understanding. Furthermore, it is plain to see
that human beings do not consistently act from duty, nor even all the time in accordance
with duty. In presenting duty as a rule to be followed always, with perfect consistency, we
make morality an unreachable ideal without grounding it in our lived experience. To this
end, I would ask Kant, how does it come to be that a child sees reason and duty not just as
rules or infeasible ideals but rather as something which they may incorporate in their
everyday lives? In teaching people and particularly children, how do we give them good
reasons and the necessary understanding to act from duty?
It is my intuition that some degree of self-interest or inclination must be present, at
least at the start, in order to help children begin to understand pure practical reason, duty,
and the categorical imperative. Kant himself recognizes the power of happiness as the most
powerful inclination that we as humans have; it is in happiness that “all inclinations unite
in one sum.” 50 Kant even goes as far as to say that “to secure one’s own happiness is one’s
duty,” but argues that the pursuit of happiness can only be moral insofar as it is done from
duty and not just from inclination. 51 What he means by this is that happiness can be morally
justified only if it is pursued with respect for others’ likewise pursuit of the same
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inclination; we need the categorical imperative as a rule to guide and regulate our pursuit
of happiness. This is all well and good – certainly duty should help shape our inclinations
toward happiness and our subsequent pursuit of happiness if we want them to be moral.
Yet this structure separates our reasons for action into “cognitive and affective halves,”52
and thus further alienates those children on the playground, for whom emotion is likely an
important force in driving their decisions and actions.
Kant, however, speaks out against the use of emotion and instead identifies it as a
skewing force of morals. This is evident from his writing about love and beneficence:
“Love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty itself – even if
no inclination whatsoever impels us to it, indeed if natural and unconquerable aversion
resists – is practical and not pathological love, which lies in the will and not in the
propensity of sensation, in principles of action and not in melting compassion; and only
the former can be commanded.” 53 In response, I argue that, particularly on the playground,
if a teacher is to be successful in inculcating morality into their students, then they must
tap into the depths of inclination, emotion, and love in order to do so. If they do not, or
present those as fundamentally opposed to morality, their students may follow the rules,
but the underlying sentiment will more likely be one of resentment than egalitarianism,
respect, or magnanimity. In order to build lasting character, the teacher must first get at the
underlying reasons why doing so will be good for the child. If a rule is the end goal, they
must build towards by first establishing the emotional scaffolding for doing so.
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Kant offers a brilliantly simple rule for how we should live if we are to be moral.
We must pursue our own ends and treat everyone else with the respect to allow them to do
the same. No action that we take may infringe upon another’s pursuit of their ends, and
every action that we take should be able to be universalized: everyone else should be able
to take the same actions as me without causing society to crumble. We each have a duty to
each other as human beings to uphold and carry out this categorical imperative, in our
thoughts, words, and deeds. Our actions must come from duty itself, however, and not
simply in accordance with duty – in other words, our dutiful actions must come from the
good will deep inside us to treat others as ends, and we may exercise this good will through
practical reason. This account is incredibly compelling and addresses how we can identify
what is good not simply according to a calculation of utility, but it misses the mark in terms
of accessibility. There is a logical gap between the way that Kant wants us to exercise our
duty and the way he believes that we learn it. This gap, I argue, can only be addressed by
meeting people where they are in the moment. The teacher on the playground, then, must
not merely repeat the imperative to the students until they are all blue in the face, but rather
must seek to understand those children’s motivations, emotions, and inclinations, in order
to bring their actions into alignment with what is good. In so doing, the teacher will begin
to lay the foundation for a flourishing life, will close the gap between the affective and the
cognitive, and will make morality accessible to anyone, regardless of their innate ability to
conceptualize the universalizable ideal. Only through an account of the virtues may we
arrive at such a methodology of teaching.
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Beyond Alienation: Finding Reason to Build Virtuous, Loving Character
In “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Peter Railton

introduces us to the cases of John and Helen. Each of these two selflessly takes care of
someone else: John of his sick wife, Anne, and Helen of her depressed friend, Lisa. Both
John and Helen do so according to a differing but similar set of moral principles. Asked
about this, John says: “I’ve always thought that people should help each other when they’re
in an especially good position to do so… Just think how awful marriage would be, or life
itself, if people didn’t take special care of the ones they love.” 54 Helen, meanwhile,
remarks: “It was the least I could do after all you’ve done for me. We’re friends, remember?
And we said a long time ago that we’d stick together no matter what. Someday I’ll probably
ask the same thing of you, and I know you’ll come through. What else are friends for?”55
John (utilitarian) and Helen (Kantian) essentially take the two approaches discussed thus
far in this chapter, and each runs into a similar difficulty: their reasons for caring for others
are alienating and impersonal. John seems to treat his wife benevolently for the sake of
promoting utility for himself and for their relationship, and this strikes Railton as
particularly uncomfortable: “It is as if John viewed [his wife], their relationship, and even
his own affection for her from a distant, objective point of view – a moral point of view
where reasons must be reasons for any rational agent and so must have an impersonal
character even when they deal with personal matters.” 56 In Helen’s case, Railton writes:
“While we understand that the specific duties she feels toward Lisa depend upon particular
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features of their relationship, still we would not be surprised if Lisa finds Helen’s response
to her expression of gratitude quite distant, even chilling.” 57
Railton points out that what is uncomfortable about John and Helen’s words is that
they are disconnected from any emotion, and any personal connection with his wife and
her friend, respectively. 58 He explains: “It is as if the world were for them a fabric of
obligations and permissions in which personal considerations deserve recognition only to
the extent that, and in the way that, such considerations find a place in this fabric.” 59 What
Railton is getting at is that John and Helen’s reasons for caring selflessly for others are
mostly or even entirely separated from the people for whom they care: for John, it seems
that we could replace Anne with anyone else and he would care for that person in the same
exact way that he cares for Anne, because that is how to ensure the best marriage; for
Helen, her friendship appears as a contract between Lisa and herself, that each of them
continually upholds because they owe it to each other to do so, but as with John, it looks
like we could replace Lisa with anyone else. There is nothing special or unique about John
and Helen’s feelings for Anne and Lisa, if they could even be called feelings. As Railton
says, it seems more accurate to categorize their actions as “obligations,” removed from
specific emotional connection.
Railton correctly identifies one of the primary troubles with both classical utilitarian
and Kantian ethics. These forms of morality are so stringent, so bound up in rule-following
– completely independent of circumstances – that they fail to connect with people as
feeling, emotional beings, and fail to appreciate the emotional basis upon which we
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generally build relationships with other people. When we truly love people, our reasons for
love do not take the form of “tit-for-potential-tat” or “this will bring about maximum utility
in our relationship,” as John and Helen’s do; rather, in flourishing relationships, our reasons
for love often come from a deep emotional base rooted in the person we love themselves.
These are the deepest and most personal relationships we have in our lives, and often form
the basis of what we think of when we think about what makes life meaningful; they cannot
be simplified to a moral framework from a utility-maximizing or duty-following rule.
In Railton’s terms, reasons based in utilitarian or Kantian ethics demonstrate a deep
alienation from one’s own emotional life. This calls into question the real goodness and
applicability of the ideals that Mill and Kant lay out; on both accounts, it is unclear that
they could give any guidance in terms of building genuine relationships. Since morality
governs how we are supposed to interact with others, should it not be well-equipped to help
us create thriving relationships? Railton, though he goes on to defend a consequentialist
framework for deep personal relationships, helps us identify a serious shortcoming faced
by both utilitarian and Kantian approaches to morality: they are out of touch with who we
are as people and what constitutes meaningful interaction with others, or with one’s work,
hobbies, or vocation. In short, utilitarian and Kantian ethics give us no insight into how we
might develop and maintain these most vital of relationships with the people around us and
our work, which are fundamental to what gives our lives meaning. This alienation from our
emotions is a serious shortcoming common to both utilitarian and Kantian ethical theories.
I hope I have made clear during this chapter that something more than a simple rule
is required of a useful or convincing ethical theory. Such a theory must give good reasons
for following it, especially to those learning to be moral beings (i.e. children). Classical
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utilitarianism does not do this, despite Mill’s best efforts: in the fourth chapter of
Utilitarianism, Mill argues that all of the reasons one needs to be virtuous and promote the
greater good are found in rationality; people often desire to live virtuously, but this is only
because they have been habituated to do so. 60 In so doing, he still does not offer a reason
why virtues would be taught in the first place. He attempts to work in an account of virtue
ethics that conforms to individual rationality, and in so doing certainly makes some
headway toward the tools necessary to living a flourishing and good life, full of rich
relationships between self, others, and our various projects. However, he falls short in terms
of giving good reasons to begin on the path toward virtue, as virtues often entail the giving
up of pleasure in the name of the pursuit of virtue. On the other hand, Kant’s categorical
imperative gives clear direction about our duty to others, but his theory offers no
mechanism for achieving the ideal it prescribes. It offers a normative standard by which
we may evaluate our actions as moral or otherwise and tells us what it is to act from duty,
but only ever gives us, especially as children, the tools to act in conformity with duty. To
move beyond this limited application, to truly act from duty, we need a theory which not
only helps us identify what is good, but also gives us a path to that ideal, and gives us good
reasons for acting by it sincerely. Once the teacher on the playground is equipped with such
a theory, they may be able to bring those two athletically inclined students into the fold,
along with the ones who asked for more fair teams in the first place.
Aristotelian virtue ethics, as I will demonstrate in the coming chapter, has the
capacity to meet us where we are, identify our emotions not as anti-moral inclinations but
rather as crucial to flourishing (if they are structured by the virtues), and be taught in a
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comprehensible way. Furthermore, it offers sound, compelling advice for how to live our
lives ethically and flourish.
If we want to flourish, we need an ethical theory that can help us live full, vibrant
lives marked by deep relationships with those around us and with our work. We need an
ethical theory that, when we are taught it, can help us act from, think with, and feel virtuous
love. We need an ethical theory that allows us to learn, understand, and build towards its
ideals instead of simply imposing a rule, an ethical theory that focuses on the process
instead of solely on outcomes. The coming chapter will demonstrate how Aristotelian
virtue ethics gives us just such a theory.

2
I.

Learning to Strive, Learning to Flourish
An Ethical Theory not at Odds with Emotions
I began the previous chapter with the declaration that most people want to live a

good life, and the fact that most people go about that project in different ways. In this
chapter I ask: if it does not make sense to adopt classical utilitarian or Kantian ethics as our
system of morality and decision-making, how can we live a good life? What theory will
help us do so? What does it even mean to live a good life to begin with? A fatal flaw of
both aforementioned theories is that they are unable to connect to the emotional human
being (i.e. the vast majority of us, especially as children). They offer straightforward
mechanisms by which we may make decisions morally, but do not give compelling reasons
for following those theories, particularly to young people learning to be good human
beings. Furthermore, they struggle to give us guidance as we navigate interpersonal
relationships, instead alienating us from the emotional part of our nature and thus
disconnecting us from those around us. In this chapter, I hope to show why Aristotelian
virtue ethics do not fall prey to the same disconnectedness from one’s emotions, and that,
instead, can be built to teach young people to learn and grow from their emotions, and
develop strength through trained emotional responses. Unlike utilitarian and Kantian
ethics, virtue ethics recognizes the importance of emotions to our lives, and helps us
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structure those emotions so that they contribute to and become constitutive of our
flourishing. In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes interpersonal relationships
as a key component of virtue and a flourishing life; 61 this, too, will be an essential piece of
the theory I develop in this chapter, and a key differentiator from utilitarian and Kantian
ethical theories, as learning to be in meaningful relationship with others (as well as with
our work) is critical to connecting our ethical theory with our real lives.

II.

How We Flourish: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Our Lives
Virtue ethics begin with the recognition of what Aristotle addresses as the final,

best, intrinsic good, toward which all other action leads, either directly or indirectly:
eudaimonia, which for these purposes I will translate to human flourishing, though it is
often translated as happiness. 62,63 What I posit in is this: to live a good life is to flourish; to
flourish requires building one’s character by nurturing the virtues, with a particular focus
on laying the groundwork for love. When we build our character from the virtues, act from
that character, and help teach our young people to do so as well, we flourish and they do,
too. With virtuous character at the heart of our system of morality and therefore the basis
of our interactions with each other, our greater society can flourish, too. Admittedly, when
defined in such terms, a good or flourishing life sounds a bit like hogwash. My goal in this
chapter is not only to elucidate what the above paragraph means and what relevance it has
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in our lives, but also to provide a general framework for how we might go about teaching
such an ethical theory.
In building this argument, it will first be essential to understand human flourishing.
Having done that, we will then need to understand the mechanism by which we may live
out that ultimate good, which Aristotle calls the virtues. Finally, after defining human
flourishing and outlining Aristotle’s account of the virtues, I will endeavor to explain why
such an account is the most unified, coherent method of working toward human flourishing.
To that end, I will also show why the virtue ethical approach succeeds in the ways I showed
Kantian ethics and Mill’s Utilitarianism cannot in the previous chapter.
As mentioned above, Aristotle’s account begins with the idea that flourishing is the
ultimate good and subservient to nothing else. To get an idea of what Aristotle means by
the ultimate good, it is useful to understand some that do not qualify. For example, money
cannot be the ultimate good, because it can only ever be a means to whatever else makes
someone happy; in the end, money can only purchase other things, and even then, cannot
bring about those that are lasting or emblematic of true human flourishing. 64 The same
could be said for fame, or health, or particular skills. That is not to say, however, that these
are not ends in themselves or could not be part of a greater conception of that ultimate
good, flourishing; they certainly could be. However, what Aristotle is saying is that those
alone, or even all put together, would be insufficient for flourishing. He warns against
simplifying the good to any one of these:
Good is spoken of in as many ways as being [is spoken of]: in what-it-is, as
god and mind; in quality, as the virtues; in quantity, as the measured
amount; in relative, as the useful; in time, as the opportune moment; in
place, as the [right] situation; and so on. Hence it is clear that the good
64
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cannot be some common and single universal; for if it were, it would be
spoken of in only one [of the types of] predication, not in them all. 65
Good comes in many forms, often relative to that which one is doing (e.g. business), as an
end of those activities (e.g. wealth, innovation, or improved efficiency or production). And
yet, if the good were relative to every singular action, there would be an infinite number of
ends, and it would be impossible to discern what exactly is good and what is not; there
would be no ultimate end. The ultimate good must be relative to the action of living, or the
conglomeration of all of our other actions.
It is important here to note that not every end from action is a good one; it is clearly
not the case that just because an action has an end, that that end is good. For example, while
part of the end of a burglary might be that the burglar’s family has enough to eat on a given
night, another part is that the person from whom they stole is now worse off without
whatever it is that was stolen. It could be the case that an end is good but an action is not,
as with the case of the so-called virtuous thief (or Robin Hood). 66 Both actions and ends
can be good or not, so our ethical theory must allow us to distinguish between good and
bad ends, as well as giving us direction when it is not totally clear, or there are
countervailing ends. Sometimes a decision about a specific end or good may be quite
difficult, and our ethical theory should give us guidance in those situations. But the ultimate
good, unlike relative goods, must be completely, intrinsically good by definition, and, so
says Aristotle, “happiness, more than anything else, seems good without qualification.
Because we always choose it because of itself, never because of something else.” 67 In other
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words, we don’t choose the sort of well-considered happiness to which this thesis refers
thinking, this happiness will lead to some other, greater good, but rather choose other
actions such that our thoughts are: If I do this, I will be happy, or If I do this, I will make
someone else particularly happy. Regardless of whatever else we pursue, our ultimate end,
lest we have been convinced otherwise by media or another external force, is a robust form
of happiness, which as I have mentioned we will call human flourishing.
While one might from this conflate the ultimate end of happiness with the seeking
of pleasure or utility, as classical utilitarianism advocates is individually rational to do,
Aristotle is quick to point out that a life dedicated as such would reduce a person to the
status of cattle, merely following pleasure, as cattle follow their food source, unthinkingly
and without any true purpose. 68 Regardless of the validity of this analysis of bovine
cognitive capacity, the point is: no adequate sense of flourishing could come purely from
following pleasure. 69 If we did so, what would stop us from stealing whenever we wanted
to, or more generally, acting without regard for those around us? This would inevitably be
mutually destructive, as nothing guarantees that two people – and certainly all the people
in the world – would seek the same pleasure, and conflict would certainly ensue. 70 If we
are to take a longer-term approach to our utilitarian calculus, we risk the subjugation of
others to the coldhearted impersonality Railton derides. A further important distinction is
that classical utilitarianism cares only about the ends of action and not the action itself, and
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as I have just mentioned, actions themselves can be good or bad, and therefore warrant our
attention. True happiness and flourishing must clearly come from something more than
each of our own pleasure or utility maximization if we are to call them the ultimate end.
Another challenge to the idea human flourishing is something that can be learned
is to ask if happiness or flourishing might be something intrinsic to oneself at birth, defined
by nature alone and not nurture. Surely, some things may be determined arbitrarily for us,
either by genetics or by some other force outside of one’s own choice, 71 such as depression,
abject poverty, or a violent household, which might diminish or enhance happiness. Just as
surely, we would not want to consign someone to a life without the possibility of
flourishing by factors outside of their control. Aristotle writes of “happy” young children:
“If he is called happy, he is being congratulated [simply] because of anticipated
blessedness; for, as we have said, happiness requires both complete virtue and a complete
life.” 72 On a related note, some social psychologists have argued that the way we act is
defined by our environment. 73 However, while one’s environment is certainly important,
what I am interested in is how we are able to take lessons from one environment to the
next; I am interested in ongoing, applicable virtue, which may be built regardless of
circumstance. Although there are strong opinions that this sort of virtue or character does
not exist and cannot be built, a complete argument against those is not within the scope of
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this thesis. 74 For the sake of this thesis, my primary argument is this: surely, our
environments play some role in our actions, for if it were otherwise, part of my alienation
critique of Kant and Mill would be invalid. However, if we only look at environments and
not at the traits that those environments instill in the individuals in them, we will lose all
ability to evaluate virtue and vice, not only on the level of the individual, but also on the
environmental level. Such a proposition seems to entail a difficult cycle to break that
consigns us to total moral relativism and the destruction of our ability to evaluate what we
think is morally good or not. 75 So, we are left with the question: if not from fulfilling
immediate desires, nor from birth, nor entirely from our environment, where does
flourishing come from?
Aristotle argues that human flourishing comes directly from a life of virtue. The
person who exercises virtue across the different areas of their life builds good character,
and the person with good character lives a flourishing life. So, what exactly is virtue? How
does one come to act virtuously, and thus build good character? What does it mean to then
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live a flourishing life? There are a few key components of each of these themes, which I
will unpack in the coming paragraphs.
To answer the first question, and address what virtue is, I use a simple comparison.
If I play a sport, it follows that I want to play that sport well. If that sport is running, running
well would entail running fast or far, and my improvement in running would consist in
improving my ability to run faster or farther. Similarly, if I am a painter, I want to paint
well. I hope to create beauty with each brush stroke, practicing this over and over to become
a better and better painter. 76 For Aristotle, virtue is similar. Simply put, virtue entails being
a human well, doing the distinctive activity of living well. This comes from a combination
of things, including partially from our circumstances, but primarily from learning to
balance between the vices of excess and deficiency in our various activities, thus reaching
what Aristotle calls a virtuous mean. So how do we learn to do that, and what are the virtues
that Aristotle speaks of?
To answer this question, I now turn to the beginning of the second book of
Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle comments on pleasure and pain. As humans, we
commonly act with some regard to our senses of pleasure and pain. As I have already
mentioned, a virtuous person does not simply follow either of these, but rather exercises
their reason to make the right choices, regardless of what would bring pleasure or pain.
However, the virtuous person also comes to derive pleasure from doing the right or virtuous
thing. One cannot, on one’s own, intuitively learn to act contrarily to one’s senses of
pleasure and pain. A baby, for example, cries when it is in pain, and giggles or smiles when
it experiences pleasure. Utilitarians often base their theories of rationality in our desire of
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pleasure and avoidance of pain, 77 and while there is certainly some merit to this idea, a
theory of morality asks how we should act, not how we are programmed to act, and
furthermore, a self-interested rationality (that is, a pleasure seeking one) paradoxically
blocks us off from some of the greatest pleasures in life. 78 On this point, Aristotle
comments: “For pleasure causes us to do base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from
fine ones. That is why we need to have had the appropriate upbringing – right from early
youth, as Plato says – to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for this is the
correct education.” 79 If people want to live well with others and flourish in our society,
they must be taught the virtues from early on.
Aristotle divides virtues into two categories: those of thought, such as “wisdom,
comprehension, and prudence,” and those of character, such as “generosity and
temperance,” among others. 80 Primarily, I will focus on virtues of character, for it is those
that are primarily what we refer to when we talk about morality (or how to make good
decisions and live good lives), since they govern our interactions with others. 81 Aristotle
writes that virtues of character arise from ethos, which translates directly as habit. 82
Flourishing must come from virtuous action, not just a virtuous disposition or environment;
one must actually go out and act virtuously in order to live a flourishing life. 83 And since
that capacity is not defined by birth alone, it must be the case that it is possible to develop
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the capacity to flourish at some point. This capacity is predicated on our learning of the
virtues, which, Aristotle argues, must be cultivated with a good teacher, “for playing the
harp makes both good and bad harpists, and it is analogous in the case of builders and all
the rest; for building well makes good builders, and building badly makes bad ones.
Otherwise no teacher would be needed, but everyone would be born a good or a bad
craftsman.” 84
As with learning any skill or craft, virtues must be thoughtfully and constantly
habituated and repeated: “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing
temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.” 85 When we act in one way or another
repetitively, those actions, the ends we associate with those actions, and critically, our
reflection on those actions, form our character. When those repetitive actions are virtuous
ones and we begin to understand why they are such, our character becomes good.
Part of what it means to develop good character is the ability to determine what
Aristotle calls the mean, which is the balance between excess and deficiency of each virtue.
This mean is much more easily discoverable through repeated action, and through
instruction of a good teacher. When a person does this in mind alone, they are unable to
receive any feedback from those that surround them, whereas actions are perceived by the
world, which allows for practice and approximation towards the mean. Yet at the same
time, the way a person structures their mind, not just their actions, is incredibly important;
the same way someone who happens to guess the correct answer to a mathematics problem
does not actually understand mathematics, a person cannot simply act in a way that happens
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to be virtuous, and genuinely be virtuous; for after doing either, they would have no greater
knowledge about how to repeat it, or more importantly, to act upon it in even a slightly
differentiated situation. Thus, people must reflect upon and learn from their actions as they
go along in order to improve as moral beings as they move through their lives.
Habituation is a key piece of building virtuous character; when the time comes, and
there is no chance to consider alternatives, a well-habituated, virtuous person makes the
virtuous decision nearly automatically, by instinct, the way an elite runner is able to extend
each stride automatically when they need to. Obviously, most decisions are not split-second
instinctual reactions, and so our ethical theory must be responsive to decisions that require
more thought as well. The painter, for example, considers each brush stroke carefully,
before moving on to the next; if our theory of living a good life did not help us to make
good decisions when a prior calculus is required, it would not help us do much in the way
of living well intertemporally. Aristotle offers another framework for these more
temporally extended decisions, which fits perfectly into the framework of habituation. We
must learn to find the mean between the vices of excess and deficiency, and the way we do
that is through voluntary action: we choose. Aristotle writes: “[actions] receive praise or
blame if they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, if they are involuntary.” 86 In
clearer terms, when we do something virtuous or vicious of our own volition, we are
responsible for that action. Yet it is also important to note that while Aristotle allows for
the possibility of an action being out of a person’s control, ignorance on that person’s part
does not qualify as such; building character is exactly what defends against such ignorance.
So, when there is an opportunity for voluntary action and we have more than a second to
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consider our course of action, we have a choice, and a chance to build character. That
choice, then, consists in three primary steps, so says Aristotle: wish, deliberation, and
decision. 87 When there is an end which we identify as something good, we wish for it.
Upon wishing for that end, we deliberate about the best means to achieve that end,
weighing the different routes we could take. Finally, after deliberation, we decide upon the
correct action and take it. 88
So, in wishing, deliberating, and deciding, we identify the good end and make our
way toward it very intentionally. This path is what builds character, and the tools we use
(wish, deliberation, and decision) are best learned from a virtuous teacher, for if we learn
to use the same tools viciously, our character will be vicious. Our habituated skills are then
put to the test, so that in all situations of voluntary action, particularly those in which we
do not have time to use those tools actively, we act in a manner that is consistent with the
character we have built in the moments when we have actively used those tools of wish,
deliberation, and decision. 89 Both virtue and vice, writes Aristotle, are within our control,
but must be responsive to our situations. What we do with those circumstances is up to us,
and in choosing virtuously or viciously, we enter into virtuous or vicious states of character,
the former conducive to flourishing, and the latter not. 90 What it means to live well varies
from person to person depending on their background, but what it means to flourish, to
seek the ultimate good, does not. For Aristotle, flourishing consists in making virtuous
decisions across the gamut of situations in a human life. The person who chooses and acts

87

Ibid, 33.
Ibid, 33-37.
89
Ibid, 37.
90
Ibid, 39.
88

52

DeRuff

virtuously, regardless of situation (but, critically, in a way responsive to that situation),
flourishes. Finally, that brings us to some of the specific virtues and vices. For the sake of
brevity and also because the list is infinitely long (including such virtues as patience,
humility, bravery, courage, compassion, temperance, generosity, magnanimity, and more),
I will detail just one of the virtues of character in depth. This should be sufficient to
understand the general concept of virtue and vice, and apply for oneself.
The first virtue Aristotle examines is bravery, and this is the virtue upon which I
will focus. 91 He defines bravery as being a mean somewhere between cowardice and
arrogance; surely, if we are being brave, we do not want to fear things which are trivial,
nor do we want to be confident in situations that do not merit confidence. 92 We do not want
to be so confident that it will lead us to do things outside of our capabilities. For example,
if a person sees another person being mugged, it is not necessarily the brave thing to
intervene no matter what. The brave person considers the situation and is able to act
intelligently based on their capabilities and the perceived necessary capabilities to
intervene; if the mugger is bigger and stronger than they are, it may make sense to call 91-1 for help, for example. Simply rushing in blind to the situational variables is not
indicative of bravery but rather of arrogance. Here I diverge from Aristotle a bit, for he
emphasizes that bravery is a rightful confidence particularly when one’s life is in danger,
including walking into a situation of sure death; he focuses on bravery in battle, 93 which
occurs to me to be somewhat less relevant in today’s day and age. Rather, applied today,
bravery may look a little different for each person. For the child on the playground, bravery
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may look like standing up to the best players, who only seek to play with each other, though
that may make the child unpopular among those better players. As has been the topic of
much news recently, bravery in the office may look like speaking out against someone who
has committed some form of sexual assault or harassment. 94 In a situation of oppression,
the brave person might use their voice to call out inequities and dedicate themselves to
improving the situation, though that may have bad consequences for them. Aristotle alludes
to such situations, but he degrades “the bravery of citizens” 95 as being something worthy,
though slightly less so than bravery in situations involving death, such as those in war. 96
Bravery need not be specifically focused in wartime, for what good is a virtue if it can only
be practiced by soldiers and not by the general populace? Certainly there might be
situations that evoke more bravery than othersm, but my key critique here of Aristotle is
that the bounds of bravery extend beyond the battlefield.
Furthermore, Aristotle extends strict boundaries on what he considers to be brave
action even on the battlefield, which strike me as out of line with what is actually meant
by bravery. He writes,
Professional soldiers, however, turn out to be cowards whenever the danger
overstrains them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment. For they
are the first to run, whereas the citizen troops stand firm and get killed…
For the citizens find it shameful to run, and find death more choiceworthy
than safety at this cost. 97
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Bravery as I have characterized it has everything to do with intense situational awareness,
sense of self and one’s own capabilities, and fear of what makes sense to be fearful of, and
less to do with an unquestioning confidence and attitude regardless of the apparent danger
of a situation. Of course, bravery might entail exceeding what is expected in a given
scenario, for example leading the charge on the battlefield when no one else will, but it
does not entail stupidity; if that charge is going to get everyone in your lines killed and
make no impact otherwise, then the brave person may be the one who restrains the arrogant
person trying to charge, or the one who makes the call for the forces to retreat and recoup.
Bravery, and the other virtues with it, entails a responsiveness to what is needed in a
situation, in accordance with a learned ethical compass. How exactly might we come to
have such a compass? How does bravery (and the other virtues) contribute to flourishing?
In the section that follows, I refer to Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, which gives us a
more practical, applicable account of virtue.

III.

How We Improve: MacIntyre’s Practices, Narrative Unity, and Traditions
Aristotle writes that the well-habituated person grows to become both virtuous and

continent (self-restraint from excessive or harmful pleasures). 98 They know what the
virtuous thing to do is in a given scenario, and they do it, because they have been habituated
to do so. Someone might also become poorly habituated into incontinence or vice. That is
to say, they might learn what the right thing to do is, but have some weakness of will, and
be unable to follow through on that right action; this would be incontinence. 99 On the other
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hand, they might be habituated into believing that the wrong things are right, for example,
that one should steal and lie to get one’s way, and thus learn to be vicious. Aristotle speaks
of habituation, and of the necessity of a good teacher to guide people to virtue like skill,
but he does not go into great depth or elaboration on the specifics of habituation. In the
previous section, we looked at bravery, and got some sense of what it means to be brave,
but how to become brave in the first place remains somewhat unclear. Aristotle writes,
“Whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end,
in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person.”100
I do not think that most people would disagree with this, but how can we habituate towards
virtues as such? MacIntyre gives an excellent answer to this; he builds virtue beginning
from the concept of practices, which allow for the discovery of internal goods.
Remember that the ultimate goal towards which virtue directs a person is living
well, much the way the goal of a runner is to run well. For MacIntyre and Aristotle alike,
this is likened to the pursuit of excellence, whether the practice be chess or running or
something else. This concept of a practice is critical to MacIntyre’s interpretation of virtue
and is the first of three logical stages which constitute his full concept of virtue, all three
of which build on Aristotle.
To start, I will dig into MacIntyre’s concept of a practice, as it puts a real-world
lens on the concept of habituation, which is so fundamental to the flourishing life.
MacIntyre defines a practice as follows:
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
100
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definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended. 101
To elucidate this concept, MacIntyre uses the example of the “highly intelligent sevenyear-old” 102 learning chess. Making himself the teacher, MacIntyre gets the child to begin
playing by offering candy for each game won. He makes the games “difficult, but not
impossible” 103 to win, thus ensuring that the child must either give a solid effort or find an
effective method of cheating to get the reward. Thus, the child begins with the idea that
chess is only a means to the ends of candy, and might consider that latter option to do
whatever it takes to win. However, as MacIntyre makes it more difficult to win the candy,
the child unveils “a new set of reasons” 104 for playing. The child comes to understand that
chess has a set of goods internal to it, such as the skill and strategy involved, the
outmaneuvering of one’s opponent, or the cognitive battle with one’s opponent. These
internal goods are circumvented by cheating, which by its nature can only focus on the
outcome of winning.
So, over the course of several (or many) games of chess, the teacher helps the child
to shift focus from the initial external good or reward (in this case candy), to the goods
internal to the practice. In learning to play the game of chess, the child comes away not
only with superior understanding and strategy, but also the beginnings of virtue; they learn
patience, which they can then apply to other areas of life; they gain the ability to logically
work through a puzzle or problem; they may even develop some friendly rapport with their
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teacher and those with whom they practice. By moving past the external goods available,
they open themselves up to a world of possible internal goods, a world only becomes
available through the virtuous hard work of attaining those internal goods. If the child
remains motivated only by the original ends, the candy, or what will bring them immediate
utility, they lose out on the patience they might have otherwise learned; moreover, they
may never even realize that it was there to be had in the first place, and will likely move
on from the game as it gets harder to attain the external goods of winning the candy.
This concept of a practice and the goods internal to it is essential to becoming a
more fully formed, virtuous person, and to living a flourishing life. For example, a child
may be able to appreciate the goods internal to bravery and honesty when called into the
principal’s office. If the child lies, they may get away with what they did, but such a lie
ultimately cuts them off from any sort of relationship with the principal. If they tell the
truth, they may suffer the immediate consequences of some discipline for their actions, but
they will have won a moral victory. Their conscience will likely be clearer for it, and the
next time such a situation rolls around, they will know to do the right thing. Their truthtelling establishes trust with the principal, and forms the basis for a relationship that is
impossible to build on lies. If they had lied in the first place and gotten away with it, it is
all the more likely that they will learn nothing from the scenario, and do the wrong thing
once again; if they are caught at a later time, the consequences are likely to be worse, but
what is more, they will have habituated a tendency of lying, which precludes them from
similar relationships in other walks of their life. 105 MacIntyre warns against this sort of
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adoption of external goods as the sole ends of action, and the importance of the virtues to
combat that:
The possession of the virtues – and not only of their semblance and
simulacra – is necessary to achieve [internal goods]; yet the possession of
the virtues may perfectly well hinder us in achieving external goods. I need
to emphasize at this point that external goods genuinely are goods. Not only
are they characteristic objects of human desire, whose allocation is what
gives point to the virtues of justice and generosity, but no one can despise
them altogether without a certain hypocrisy. Yet notoriously the cultivation
of truthfulness, justice, and courage will often, the world being contingently
what it is, bar us from being rich or famous or powerful. Thus although we
may hope that we can not only achieve the standards of excellence and the
internal goods of certain practices by possessing the virtues and become
rich, famous, and powerful, the virtues are always a potential stumbling
block to this comfortable ambition. We should therefore expect that, if in a
particular society the pursuit of external goods were to become dominant,
the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps
something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound. 106
What MacIntyre is saying is that we must hold dear to internal goods, for if we supplant
them with external ones or make them subservient to external ones in any way (i.e.
friendship as a means to gaining political power) then we lose the internality and true
worthiness of them. Considered with this example, if the child learns to lie to get their way,
they will find it more and more difficult to trust and be trusted and therefore will struggle
to form meaningful relationships. They may succeed in their cunning, but they will be
worse for it. In this way, whether a person discovers the goods internal to a practice or
focuses only on external goods, either may feed back into itself, to lead toward a virtuous
character in the case of the former and a vicious one in the latter case. But, once a child
understands those internal goods and the exercise of the virtues (i.e. of patience, or bravery,
or honesty), they also come to understand the value of each of these to the greater goods in
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life, such as friendship and the other loving relationships that are so critical to
flourishing. 107 There is one lingering question: are there some practices that are, in fact,
bad? Might certain practices lend themselves, rather than to the building of virtue, to the
building of vice? The answer is certainly yes, as suggested above with the example of lying,
but a further qualification of the concept of practices helps protect against these: the
necessity of relationship to practices, which I will elucidate in an example below, and
which will be intimately relevant in later two chapters.
A child at summer camp is exposed to many different practices, from archery to
woodworking, swimming to learning a musical instrument, from which they may choose
one or many. Any of these has the potential not only to beget to them external goods, such
as prizes or ranks or achievements recognized publicly, but also goods internal to that
specific practice, such as the distinct satisfaction that comes along with a bullseye after
pushing through many misses, the mastery of a specific sanding technique in the woodshop,
the overcoming of fear of the water, or a newly gained ability to play a difficult song.
Furthermore, these goods, which may only come along with respect to a particular
practice, 108 offer different avenues by which one may learn the virtues. Any of the previous
examples may lead to patience, resilience, determination, or attention to detail (to name
but a few virtues) by exposing a camper to failure, which are arguably the greater internal
goods at play. These virtues are not limited to one or another of these specific practices,
but they are internal to the practices in that they are not simply sought after as the sole ends
of a practice. One cannot, for example, force one’s way into a sense of patience. Rather, in
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trying, failing, and trying again at a certain practice, one is able to habituate the virtue of
patience. However, in practicing swimming, or woodworking, or chess, and failing, one
could become frustrated, and habituate that frustration. If the latter is the case, it will then
have negative impacts on their attainment of external goods as well; if they become easily
frustrated, they will have difficulty pushing themselves through hard tasks, thus blocking
them from both internal and external goods. On the other hand, if they are able to learn
patience and dedication through a difficult project, they can apply this across other areas
of their lives, thus unlocking further internal and (potentially) external goods.
This points to the Aristotelian requirement of a good teacher: it is important that
someone, especially a child, be directed as they work at a practice, lest they fall into
ongoing frustration, or worse yet, into a cycle of cheating to achieve the accolades they
desire. To prevent against this, MacIntyre notes the imperative of “a certain kind of
relationship between those who participate in [a practice].” 109 If a child does not fulfill their
part of a practice, or cheats on a test for a rank in swimming (for example), they default on
their part of the shared pursuit of goods internal to that practice. In the swimming case, the
camper who cheats on a test to achieve the desired rank not only cheats the system, but
also the counselor who worked to teach them, as this precludes the future success of the
practice in that relationship. Finally, the camper cheats themselves, because they know that
they did not deserve the rank (or external good), and furthermore, have cut themselves off
from the internal goods associated with the practice of swimming, at least at that moment
in time – they are not a better swimmer for cheating, and they know that intimately well.
They lose on all fronts except the attainment of the external good; this is especially
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detrimental to their ability to their ability to flourish. However, if the camper and counselor
work together toward the shared goal of the camper overcoming whatever obstacles stand
in their way towards improving at the practice, each opens themselves to a great bounty of
internal goods: friendship and mutual respect stand out as two possibilities, alongside the
individual goods, such as skill and strategy, as well as the learned virtues of patience,
dedication, and more. By the discovery of internal goods through practices, what is right
or virtuous and what is desired begin to align in one’s mind. The gains to both camper and
counselor are enormous, but only truly available if each honors the relationship and
everything that entails.
Thus, relationship forms a key part of the discovery internal goods via practices.
Strong relationships bolster the learning of practices and likewise, learning a virtuous
practice opens all parties up to stronger relationships. Aristotle both notices and emphasizes
this: “Friendship… is a virtue, or involves virtue. Further, it is most necessary for our life.
For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods.” 110 For
MacIntyre, friendship stands out as a remarkable internal good that comes from the genuine
embrace of practices, and is unavailable to those who treat the practice as a means to
external goods. And, as MacIntyre writes, “to enter into a practice is to enter into a
relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also those who have preceded
us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice
to its present point.” 111 If a person wants to open themselves to the goods internal to a
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particular practice, they are accountable not only to themselves and those with whom they
enter the practice, but also to the integrity and legacy left by those who have gone before.
Practices, and the goods internal to them, are an excellent conceptual framework
by which to imagine virtue. Through these practices, we come to appreciate and open
ourselves to the greatest internal goods available. The next question is: so what? Why do
we need a practice to learn virtues? Why bother involving ourselves in these practices to
begin with, especially if they are difficult? What do they bring to the rest of our lives?
MacIntyre’s answer is the next step in his account of virtue: the narrative unity of a human
life. This is an essential concept to virtue because it requires that the lessons we learn from
practices do not go unused in the rest of our lives. The previous paragraphs allude to this
in two ways: first, the latter set of goods internal to practices (patience and other virtues)
are ones that may (and should) be applied across one’s life (for example, patience
developed in learning archery may be applied in learning woodcraft, or in working to
understand another person in a disagreement); second, entering into the relationships
necessary to reaping the goods internal to a given practice incurs an accountability that
makes inconsistency across the practice difficult (for example, one cannot truly achieve
goods internal to a practice if they lie to other practitioners selectively). MacIntyre gives a
sense of the narrative unity of a human life as following:
The liquidation of self into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing allows
no scope for the exercise of dispositions which could genuinely be
accounted virtues in any sense remotely Aristotelian. For a virtue is not a
disposition that makes for success only in one particular type of situation.
What are spoken of as the virtues of a good committee man or a good
administrator or of a gambler or a pool hustler are professional skills,
professionally deployed in those situations where they can be effective, not
virtues. Someone who genuinely possesses a virtue can be expected to
manifest it in very different types of situations, many of them situations
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where the practice of a virtue cannot be expected to be effective in the same
way that we expect a professional skill to be. 112
So, for the camper who has learned to be patient when shooting archery, that patience, or
the way that they learn to release the tension in their body and center themselves by
exhaling before each shot, is not a virtue unless they are able to apply it to other arenas of
their life. They must learn to extend that beyond the archery range, and for this, as I have
mentioned multiple times and Aristotle emphasizes, a good teacher is imperative. 113
MacIntyre uses the word “narrative” here quite intentionally: a person is “not only an actor,
but an author.” 114 Thus, through the instruction of a good teacher, we learn the virtues
through practices and apply them readily throughout our lives, determining our own path
or narrative to the extent we can.
Referring back to the other example, of bravely being honest with the principal, the
child who lies in some scenarios but tells the truth in others violates this principle of virtue
according to the narrative unity of a human life. Truthfulness becomes for them something
to be used as a tool when it is necessary and loses its value as a virtue. If we are only
truthful when it is convenient to us, then that truthfulness is not a facet of our character; we
are creating a discontinuity in the narratives of our lives. Rather, we must learn to strive
for truthfulness across our lives, in all but the most extenuating of circumstances. I
intentionally use the language of striving here, as it becomes important as well to
understand both the intentions behind one’s actions and the circumstances belying those
actions. Certainly, a lie told accidentally under the belief that what they were saying to be
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true is different as lying with full knowledge of the consequences of that lie, even if those
consequences turn out to be the same. The liar in the first case, if they are virtuous, upon
discovering that they have lied, might seek out the recipient of said lie to correct the
mistake, having come to understand the goods internal to telling the truth, most especially
strong relationships. A further example to help us understand the importance of intention
and circumstance might be lying on behalf of another person’s well-being; 115 doing so is
quite evidently a different (and potentially more virtuous) scenario than lying solely for
personal gain.
So, our situation and our motives matter; MacIntyre qualifies his earlier statement
about authorship with the following caveat: “We are never more (and sometimes less) than
the co-authors of our own narratives… We enter upon a stage which we did not design and
we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our own making… Each of our dramas
exerts constraints on each other’s, making the whole different from the parts, but still
dramatic.” 116 In using this analogy to the theatrical stage, MacIntyre outlines the idea that
we all exist within the constraints of our situations and other people’s actions, and cannot
control those, but that we still “write our own histories,” so to speak, and are accountable
for the decisions we make and their impacts on others. In other words, whatever the
differences in our constraints, it is imperative that each of us take control of what we can:
our own actions and reactions to those constraints. The virtuous person is the one who,
relative to their constraints, responds in accordance with such virtues as patience, bravery,
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and honesty to the extent they can, and who pushes that extent further as they move
throughout their personal narrative. MacIntyre alludes to just this idea in his discussion of
unity:
In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its
unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask ‘What is
the good for me?’ is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it
to completion. To ask ‘What is the good life for man?’ is to ask what all
answers to the former question must have in common. But now it is
important to emphasize that it is the systematic asking of these two
questions and the attempt to answer them in deed as well as in word which
provide the moral life with its unity. 117
He adds, furthermore:
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will
not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to
practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the
good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations, and
distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing
self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. 118
So, in continually asking ourselves the two questions from the first selection, we are able
to take an active stance in our own lives, 119 which involves a constantly improving
understanding and application of the virtues. When ask these questions and act on the
answers, we flourish, necessarily in conjunction those around us. Those answers depend
on our situation and narrative history. This helps us get at the final piece of MacIntyre’s
conception of virtue: the moral tradition in which each of us operates along our narratively
unified quest for the flourishing life.
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Each of us, so says MacIntyre, begins our lives at our “moral starting point[s],”120
which are defined by the city, state, or country where we were born and lived, the family
in which we grew up, etc.: in essence, our moral starting point is constituted by our
environment. This is the initial standpoint from which we may begin to ask questions about
the good. It is necessarily wrapped up in the history and future; “the story of my life is
always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity.” 121
Therefore, white people in the US must be cognizant of the history of slavery, segregation,
and ongoing discrimination in the country, just as Aryan Germans must be cognizant of
the Holocaust and the oppression of the Jewish people. 122 Because each of us is the “coauthor” of our own narrative, we bear some responsibility for fixing it and making it better;
these constraints “[do] not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations” of one’s
historical or cultural location, but rather must recognize and be responsive to it. 123
So, each of us inherits some moral tradition, or many, depending on the different
environments in which we grow, and which have contributed to our moral starting point.
Moral traditions are passed down, often through institutions, whether those are formal, as
in a school or governmental body, or informal, as within a family. 124 As MacIntyre writes,
“traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict,” 125 meaning that, if they are
virtuous, they are on a constant course of improvement. On such a course, they, and the
individuals that comprise them, must continually ask the same sorts of questions that

120

MacIntyre, After Virtue, 220.
Ibid, 221.
122
Ibid, 220.
123
Ibid, 221.
124
Ibid, 222.
125
Ibid, 222.
121

Chapter 2

67

individuals ask themselves: “What is the good for this institution? What is the good for the
individuals involved in it and whose lives it touches?” Further, practices are often defined
by the moral traditions that carry them into the present. 126 Practices, and the virtues they
require and build, carry the capacity to change and update moral traditions, thus bringing
those traditions to life and helping them evolve. This is a critical difference from Kantian
or utilitarian moral theory. Whereas with either of those the history of an institution and its
traditions are irrelevant and what is important is that the rule is followed, along MacIntyre’s
conception, such moral traditions are a key part of each member’s moral development, and
as such must push themselves in a similar way to how those members push themselves. 127
Moral traditions define our moral environment, and give us the context from which we
improve as moral beings; because the greater world is constantly changing and evolving,
and we with it, our moral tradition must not be a stagnant, unchanging rule, but something
that evolves and improves along with that world and its inhabitants.
MacIntyre thus provides a more concrete framework through which we may
understand virtue ethics. It is simultaneously idealistic, in that it focuses on human
flourishing, and realistic, as it takes into account our background and gives us mechanisms
by which to identify what it means for us to flourish both individually and collectively and
how to act on it. Practices help us, particularly as young learners, to identify internal goods
and the virtues necessary to achieve those, and help us, quite literally, to practice those
virtues and incorporate them into our character. A good teacher can then help us to
understand that virtuous action is not limited to particular practices. By pointing our
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learned virtues outward from specific practices, we come to understand the narrative unity
of our lives, and our position as a co-author of that narrative. Our moral tradition writes the
other part of our narrative: it defines our moral starting point, or the basis from which we
may improve, and also defines the practices to which we are typically exposed as we grow.
Throughout each aspect of MacIntyre’s theory, we are pushed to ask the questions: “What
is the good for me? What is the good for others? What is the good for this institution? How
can I/we improve and push that good further?” MacIntyre thus gives a comprehensive and
applicable account of the virtues that is accessible to anyone, from any starting point. It
does not hold the same standards of outcomes across different situations as utilitarian
theory might, nor does it hold a rule to be paramount to all else, as Kantian theory does.
Rather, it simply asks each of us, regardless of our setting, to take note of our status quo,
question how we may improve it, and move toward that improvement. MacIntyre notes
that this is often done in relationship with others, and through a process of deliberation akin
to Aristotle’s. These relationships and deliberative processes are a crucial part of practices
and the discovery of internal goods. In the section that follows, I look to Julia Annas’
Intelligent Virtue for some further clarification on the interrelatedness of virtues conceived
as similar to practical skill-building 128 and as constitutive of flourishing.

IV.

Putting it All Together: Annas’ Skill-Building Analogy and Human Flourishing
Julia Annas’ concept of the virtues is as follows:
A virtue is a lasting feature of a person, a tendency for the person to be a
certain way. It is not merely a lasting feature, however, one that just sits
there undisturbed. It is active: to have it is to be disposed to act in certain
ways. And it develops through selective response to circumstances. Given
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these points, I shall use the term persisting rather than merely lasting… A
virtue is also a reliable disposition… Further, a virtue is a disposition which
is characteristic–that is, the virtuous (or vicious) person is acting in and
from character when acting in a kindly, brave, or restrained way. This is
another way of putting the point that a virtue is a deep feature of the
person. 129
Virtue for Annas is comprised of a number of the things I have noted: it is consistent (in
good situations and bad) and as such, takes active input and questioning. It cannot, for
example, be reduced to mere passive habit or routine, but rather must be actively and
thoughtfully applied and reapplied. 130 This echoes much of what MacIntyre brings to our
understanding. Further, she notes the importance of development to virtue (and which
distinguish virtue from routine); this is the part of her work upon which I will focus.
Crucial to Annas’ conception is this distinction between learning the virtues like
skills contrasted with simple routine. A good example of routine, she argues, is driving to
the university every day: she does this unthinkingly, without any intention or telos; there
is no end aside from arriving at the university parking garage. 131 Virtues, on the other hand,
require all the aspects mentioned in the above quotation: they must be active, causing one
to question them and develop them further, and they must be reliable characteristics deeply
integrated into one’s self. She uses the example of learning the piano to provide the
groundwork for her conception of learning and using a virtue: in learning the piano, we
must begin by consciously pushing ourselves (or being pushed) to improve, and then
practice over and over, thoughtful as to what we are getting wrong and how to improve it;
however, if we reach a point at which we have mastered a certain piece, simply playing it
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over and over will not help us to become better pianists. 132 Left alone to simple routine or
repetition, piano playing – and virtue – will “ossify and decay.” 133 Rather, the brilliant
pianist and the virtuous person exist in a state of perpetual improvement without ceiling.
Furthermore, practical skills and virtue, as mentioned in the sections on Aristotle and
MacIntyre, require adaptation in novel situations, and routine alone cannot prepare us for
anything unexpected.
Why strive to be better though? Certainly, it makes sense to strive to become better
at practical skills, whether those involve the playing of an instrument or a sport, as the ones
that incite passion in us have their own rewards; these are the internal goods about which
MacIntyre focuses his theory of practices. What gives us the “drive to aspire” to become
more virtuous, which forms a central part of Annas’ theory? What are our motivations for
doing so? How can we learn the reasons why we should be virtuous? MacIntyre presented
the model of practices, like chess, through which internal goods are revealed through the
learning and application of relevant virtues, and which constitute a part of the motivation
for acting virtuously; they are accessible only through the genuine exercise of those virtues.
Annas echoes this sentiment and emphasizes the importance of the good teacher. 134
Especially with respect to skills of significant complexity (i.e. which cannot be applied
solely through routine but require consideration and adaptation), a teacher must be
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sufficiently articulate 135 to explain the underlying reasons why learning a given skill
matters. 136 Annas writes:
The learner in virtue, like the learner in a practical skill, needs to learn what
she is doing, to achieve the ability to do it for herself, and to do it in a way
that improves as she meets challenges, rather than coming out with
predictable repetition. This comes about when the virtue is conveyed by the
giving and receiving of reasons. 137
Those reasons, as alluded to by MacIntyre in his theory of practices, often come through
the learning of other lessons or practices. 138 Virtues become apparent and necessary as we
work through other problems, like learning to swim or paint or converse. We realize that
in order to solve these problems, we must be patient and persistent, pushing ourselves
through periods of boredom and difficulty, or honest, even if it is against our immediate
interests to do so, or brave, continuing on even in a state of discomfort. The good teacher
understands that the way they teach skills has implications for their pupils’ learning not
only of those skills but also of the way the relevant virtues may then be applied outside of
the specific context in which they are taught. Moreover, the good teacher knows their
student and can adapt the lesson, practice, or explanation to be relevant to a given pupil.
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Finally, the good teacher must also be a model of the behavior they seek to teach the
student; this helps the student observe what the virtues look like in practice and helps them
envision themselves doing the same things in their own way (not just by rote), but also is
essential, because if the teacher does not do this, then they will not be able to credibly
explain to the student why it is important. Each of these points further underscore the
importance of a strong relationship – founded on mutual respect and support, as well as
other virtues – between teacher and student.
Provided a good teacher, a pupil (especially a child) may come to understand
relevant virtues and their broad, varied application. But what about those who do not have
good teachers? What about those who are not interested in learning to act virtuously?
Annas calls this person “ethically lazy” 139 – if this is meant to describe the person who has
not had good ethical role models, I do not like this term. It does not seem to me to be the
fault of a person that they have not had these people in their lives. I will avoid using this
term, though it does certainly does apply to some people. In turn, I prefer to emphasize the
importance of making good teachers as broadly available as possible. All that aside, Annas
argues that if a person does not readily apply the virtues, their “rigid dispositions… will be
ill-suited to coping with the world.” 140 In other words, if someone does not aspire to apply
their virtues in different scenarios, they will be ill-equipped to respond to the different
things that life throws their way. Annas argues: this person “may come to learn that her
reactions are inadequate the painful way, in encounters with the world which may end up
driving her to aspire, if only to avoid the ethical disasters which come from routine
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mimicking of role models.” 141 While this may be the case, I am not totally sure that such a
situation alone will drive a person to dispositional change. In my assessment, this
underscores the importance of the good teacher; a person who struggles to apply the virtues
may have difficulty learning to do so faced simply with the fact that whatever they are
doing is not working. So, part of Annas’ account is the practical skill analogy. The second
part ties virtue back into flourishing.
In addressing the second part of Annas’ theory, I begin with a potential critique. On
the account I have outlined, it looks like Annas, MacIntyre, and I may fall into a utilitarian
or consequentialist trap, as if the virtues are just whatever brings about internal goods, and
eventually flourishing. This is not the case; Annas emphasizes (and I do, too) that virtue is
aspirational:
[The virtues] are inspiring, not just useful or agreeable, because exercising
virtue is a commitment on the part of the virtuous person to goodness
because it is goodness: goodness is not just the outcome. The different
virtues appear to be focused on different values, but the virtuous life consists
in the living of a life, not its circumstances, and so the diversity of ways of
life and the values they focus on is not a barrier to the unification of the
virtues, and thus an aspiration to a good life overall. 142
Thus, the virtuous life is one in which we are constantly aspiring to become better people,
to treat others with more respect and patience, to exercise more honesty and generosity, to
practice presence, thoughtfulness, and responsiveness to others and our circumstances,
novel or otherwise. It consists in the way we structure our thoughts and the actions
themselves, not just the outcomes of those actions. For if we have put hard work,
persistence, and dedication into some activity, which has an external good attached to it,
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like an athletic championship, we will paradoxically end up with the better outcome than
if we had solely pursued the external good in the first place. In the latter case (the
consequentialist one), if our ends are that good, the championship, and we don’t achieve
them, then we are left with nothing; success for us becomes binary. But if we come to
appreciate the goods internal to such a pursuit, then we are not left empty-handed if we do
not win the championship. Instead, we have become better athletes and competitors, better
bonded with our teammates, and more determined for the following season. Even without
the external good in hand, with the bitter taste of defeat in our mouth, which admittedly is
not fun in the moment, we are flourishing. We have come to understand that external and
internal goods do not necessarily always go together. Ironically, this is unequivocally a
better outcome than the resentment that would ensue if the only good we recognized was
the external one. Furthermore, in the event that we do win, we will also be better off, for
we will have both the external good as well as the internal goods as opposed to the external
good alone. So, flourishing is a part of life, something that, in constantly aspiring to it, we
live out in the everyday. In so doing, we live virtuously, and begin to see the great value of
the application of virtue not only in the pursuit of one practice or skill or another, but across
the different arenas of our lives.
Annas thus offers a beautiful synthesis of what we have learned in this chapter.
Flourishing is necessarily wrapped up in the learning and subsequent improvement of the
virtues, as Aristotle emphasized thousands of years ago in his discussion of habituation.
Much the way MacIntyre emphasizes practices in the discovery of internal goods, Annas
presents virtues as analogous to the learning of practical skills: in engaging in practices and
under the guidance of a good teacher, we come to the realization that flourishing is not just
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an end ideal but something that we live out every day when we live virtuously. Like
MacIntyre, Annas notes that a sense of virtue is useless if we cannot apply it across many
different areas of our lives. Her discussion of moving beyond rote learning, which fits
perfectly with his regarding the narrative unity of a human life, puts this particularly
emphatically. We cannot think of ourselves as different actors in different situations;
though our application of the virtues must certainly be environmentally responsive, it is
essential that we see our virtuous action in one scenario as linked to our action in all others
and part of our whole character. And, like MacIntyre, Annas recognizes that our learning
of the virtues is partially defined by our environment; she calls this our “embedded
context.” 143 In concluding this chapter, I hope to bring together these different aspects and
respond specifically to what I identified as the shortcomings of utilitarian and Kantian
ethics in the previous chapter.
There are two crucial points at which both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics fall
short. The first is each theory’s unteachable nature. Both theories clearly outline ideals: for
Mill and other utilitarians, like Singer, the ideal is the greatest good for the greatest number
of people; for Kant, the ideal is the categorical imperative, which means that we can pursue
our own ends only insofar as we understand and respect the rights of everyone else to do
the same, thus acting from duty and upon the universalizing principle. Given mature,
exceptionally other-regarding adults, these might be reasonable ideals to hold, though I
believe that the second (forthcoming) critique casts that into doubt. This chapter has been
particularly concerned with this primary critique. Annas puts this clearly and beautifully:
The crucial point about skill under discussion is a point about how it is
taught and learnt, and so the context to examine is the analogous one for
143
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virtue, namely contexts of teaching and learning. This also does justice to
an important point about virtue ethics, as opposed to other kinds of ethical
theories. Understanding the process of ethical education is a part of virtue
ethics. Ethical education is not something ‘merely practical’ and so
extraneous to theory. We cannot understand what virtue is without coming
to understand how we acquire it. Virtue ethical theories are thus not theories
which recommend themselves on other grounds–economy of basic terms,
simple structure, and the like–and leave us to find out for ourselves whether
such a theory can be put into practice. 144
Unlike the other two ethical theories discussed here, virtue ethics is intimately interlinked
with how it is taught.
Even if we were to decide that we might rather use utilitarianism or Kantian thought
as the basis of our ethics, we would need some way to learn to do so; because neither is
able to give a satisfactory account of learning, either defaults into virtue ethics. For Mill,
we need to learn the virtue of being other-regarding and incorporate it into our utility
functions. As we have seen, this turns into a chicken-and-egg problem going back to the
question of why someone would want to teach other-regarding preferences in the first
place, and gets at the question: if utility-maximizing actors somehow manage to inculcate
other-regarding preferences in others, is it not still to one’s advantage to renege on those
on those preferences so as to take advantage of others and maximize one’s own utility?
This leads to dizzying contortions of adapting our preferences to suit the greater good, and
ultimately is difficult to comprehend in practice, especially when utilitarian literature
emphasizes individual rationality as being inherently self-interested. Kantian thought, on
the other hand, runs into the issues previously discussed of how one gets to acting from
duty when all he really offers by way of teaching results in us acting solely in conformity
with duty. For any ethical theory, learning is an absolutely essential aspect if the theory is
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to be passed on. Virtue ethics, as I have shown in this chapter, is the only theory that fully
integrates that aspect.
Not only does virtue ethics as conceived in this chapter account for the necessity of
learning ethics, it also gives concrete mechanisms by which we may do so: MacIntyre’s
concept of practices and Annas’ skill analogy help us to understand the ways in which
children (and also adults faced with a turning point in their lives) may learn to live
virtuously. This account of virtue ethics takes into account one’s background and moral
context or tradition, and meets people where they are, instead of relating their action to an
unchanging ideal, with a strict declaration of whether or not an action is moral. In learning
according to this virtue-ethical account, children flourish as they go; there is no outcome
set by an infeasible ideal. This ties into the second primary issue with the other two theories.
The second critique of utilitarian and Kantian ethics, along Peter Railton’s account,
is that both are alienating to humans as we know ourselves to be: emotional and reliant on
interpersonal interaction. Neither utilitarian nor Kantian ethics give us any sense of what it
means to interact lovingly with other human beings. Part of the virtue-ethical account of
flourishing, on the other hand, is that this theory necessitates interpersonal interaction and
learning, and the discovery of internal goods often entails such things as friendship and
loving relationship. Virtue ethics, as presented here, moves past the pursuit of particular
ends or the following of an impersonal rule to emphasize that living virtuously means a
constant improvement without a necessary ceiling or a specific outcome – striving is, in
and of itself, human flourishing. This theory, while not easily distilled to a simple rule,145
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is remarkably applicable in our lives, no matter how different our culture or upbringings
may be.
In the chapter that follows, I will look at an integral aspect of flourishing: love. In
the sense that I intend it, it is intentionally excluded from Kant’s theory of ethics and
impossible to account for in a classical utilitarian approach; it is identified as being strictly
opposed to rationality in both. Yet it infuses our lives, as well as the lives of those around
us, with meaning; in its very essence it connects us meaningfully to others, and by
extension, gets us closer to the Kantian ideal of practical love than Kantian theory even
can. As a critical part of human flourishing, it is perfectly at home in Aristotelian virtue
ethics, and in the following chapter, I will show how the virtues both support love and can,
in turn, be pushed forward and improved upon by that love.

3
I.

Virtuous Love and Human Flourishing
Laying the Groundwork for Love
When many people think about love, they think about Romeo and Juliet, the

Notebook, and the like, about some irrational, uncontrollable, romantic force that compels
us to do things we would never otherwise consider. We can also love things that we do,
perhaps our jobs, our studies, or our side hobbies, and occasionally our love for these things
can blind us to the amount of ourselves we are giving over. When we are in love, we
sacrifice for others, go out of our way to make another person happy, and what is more,
sometimes do these things completely at the expense of our own health, wellbeing, and
even happiness. Love sometimes puts us in distinctly unhealthy, harmful, or otherwise bad
situations: abusive relationships are one example; giving every waking hour to our work
without time for our family or our sanity is another. When it is healthy, love can give us
great joy and fill our lives with meaning in a way that we might think of as imminently
close to what I have described as flourishing in this book. In this chapter, I will focus less
on the passionate, romantic love we see in movies and feel strongly, and more on the factors
that underlie a sustained, healthy, balanced love. As intimated in the first chapter, such a
conception of love has no home in Kantian or classical utilitarian theories. Rather, love in
its many different forms is a key part of a flourishing life, and, as I will show in this chapter,
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is intimately interwoven with and supported by the virtue-ethical theory laid out in the
second chapter. Love builds up who we are, is manifested in our daily choices, and involves
hard, thoughtful work and improvement on our part. I conclude the chapter with a
discussion of the hypothesis that the cultivation of a loving attitude, which comes from an
inculcation of the virtues, creates a positive feedback loop back into a person’s character,
helping them to continue to strive towards improving it.
Love comes in many forms, each of which helps to make our lives meaningful. Of
course, love can be between two people in a romantic sense, as it is commonly thought of,
though I will spend less time on romantic love than its popularity perhaps warrants. I am
also interested in such forms of love as platonic love between friends, the essential love of
oneself, familial love within families, a love of what one does, and the moral love that
connects us to all things, places, and people, even those things, places, and people we do
not know and will never encounter. This chapter will even go as far as to touch on the love
that compels us to care for those who harm us, though of course this is a complicated case,
and requires particular attention to the virtues.
Thus, I speak of love generally, but I think that the above descriptions share an
underlying characteristic: they detail the way that love connects us deeply to each other, to
the things around us, to our world. This meaningful connection is what makes love
distinctive and helps it find its home in virtue ethics, particularly when considered against
such theories as utilitarianism or Kantian thought. 146 This chapter will go on to detail a
further aspect of virtuous love, which distinguishes it from desire and dutiful beneficence:
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it involves a sort-of loving principle of charity, which pushes us to see what is around and
within us in the best light possible, and to react as such. This is not to advocate a naïve
approach to life in which we ignore shortcomings in ourselves, others, and the world
around us; rather, this principle of charity defines how we respond to those shortcomings.
It asks us to respond lovingly and in accordance with the virtues to ourselves and others in
imperfect situations. So, what it means to love virtuously is three-pronged: first, it
necessarily involves meaningful connection between ourselves and something else; 147
second, it requires the loving principle of charity; third, it is an essential ingredient of a
flourishing life. When we act, think, and feel virtuous love, we flourish in the most brilliant
way imaginable. Before I go into these characteristics, I will briefly touch on why love in
the robust sense to which I refer cannot be properly accounted for in Kantian or utilitarian
ethical theories.

II.

Pathological Emotion, Master of Reason, or Neither?
In the first chapter of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant separates

love as inclination (the emotional love which I claim is essential to flourishing) from ethics:
“For love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty itself – even
if no inclination whatsoever, indeed if natural and unconquerable aversion resists – is
practical and not pathological love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of
sensation, in principles of action and not in melting compassion; and only the former can
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be commanded.” 148 While Kant does argue that every person has an imperative to “secure
[their] own happiness,” this happiness, and the pathological, or emotional, love that may
be a part of it, find their home outside his ethical theory. 149 For Kant, ethics are all about
pure reason and acting from one’s duty to others as described by the categorical imperative.
They have nothing to do with following one’s inclinations, for each person’s different
inclinations could lead them in a whole host of directions if taken to be the basis of their
ethical theories. With emotions, it is clear that there can be no overriding rule, no
categorical imperative, for everyone experiences their emotions differently, and these
emotions cannot be controlled, whereas pure reason and a universal principle are
fundamentally within the grasp of anyone, at any point in time, anywhere in the world,
provided they use their practical reason. There is nothing fair, just, or dutiful about
emotions, per Kant’s analysis, and therefore, they should not guide the ways in which we
interact with other people.
As I hope has been clear from the first chapter, this is quite clearly far removed
from the way that we actually interact with each other, as well as the way we want to
interact with each other. While Kant can give us a rule that can inform us as to whether an
interaction follows his moral principles, that rule tells us nothing about how to interact
when faced with emotions, whether our own or belonging to the person with whom we are
interacting. Kant advocates a practical love of other people that extends to every other
human purely on the basis of being human – per the categorical imperative, every human
is just as much deserving of our moral actions as every other. Yet this ignores the
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importance of emotions in our lives. We often have intensely close emotional connections
from early on in our lives with our family members, and many of us seek out emotional
connections with other people as we move through our lives. Regardless of the soundness
of Kant’s logic, because it gives us no guidance as to what to do with these emotional
relationships, it doesn’t really give us much of a guide to navigating our own lives. A
person, after being treated according to a sense of duty, will not come away from an
interaction thinking, Wow! My friend really cares about me! Rather, they will be much
more likely to have feelings of alienation from that friend, an emotional distance that Kant
cannot cross. Kant emphasizes the impersonality of practical love, but in so doing, he
focuses only on practicality and removes any notion of love as we know it: emotional and
integral to meaning and flourishing in our lives. 150 Virtue ethics, on the other hand, offers
us concrete ways to structure our love with the virtues, so that it actively brings meaning
to our own lives and the lives of others, and therefore helps to bring about mutual
flourishing.
Though it is not perfectly parallel with utilitarianism, on the opposite end of the
moral spectrum from Kant’s work sits Hume’s, and the two are importantly connected.
Kant credits Hume with having awoken him from a “dogmatic slumber,” 151 after which he
was able to create the ethical theory summarized in the Groundwork, amidst his many other
works. Hume is important to briefly include in this discussion because while Kant focuses
entirely on reason and the categorical imperative in structuring our interactions with the
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world, Hume wants to structure them as coming from the “passions.” 152 Essentially, by
Hume’s view, we follow our passions, our feelings of pleasure and pain, and our reason is
secondary to these senses. 153 This, too, cannot possibly be constitutive of our ethical theory,
for while it gives us room to follow our emotions, such as love, it puts them squarely in the
driver’s seat, and casts the virtues, or any sense of reason, into the backseat, with little
control over where our actions may go. They may only plead with our passions, but in the
end must always defer to them.
Humean thought and utilitarianism do share at least one important and relevant
detail in common: they both relate worldly interactions to one’s self. For Hume, those
worldly interactions incite the passions, which lead us to act, meanwhile for utilitarians,
worldly interactions bring about some sense of utility, thus causing us to pursue them. As
with Kantian ethics, utilitarianism fails to appreciate the emotional value of connections.
When actions are taken so as to bring about the greatest utility, either individually or as
part of a collective, they misread emotional connection as a rational calculation of value;
Aristotle writes:
Those who love for utility or pleasure, then, are fond of a friend because of
what is good or pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is who
he is; but insofar as he is useful and pleasant. Hence these friendships as
well [as the friends] are coincidental, since the beloved is loved not insofar
as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure. And
so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved, when the friends do not
remain similar [to what they were]; for if someone is no longer pleasant or
useful, the other stops loving him. 154
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This denies that connection the possibility of being genuinely emotional, because it places
the focus on the usefulness of the relationship instead of the love of each other as people;
the external goods of the connection take precedence over the more important internal ones.
Even if modified to consider the utility of the whole, that utility may change or go away,
and if it is not there, what will hold a relationship together? It seems that classical
utilitarians would be committed to the idea that a relationship that no longer brings utility
should end.
What Kant, Hume, and utilitarians have in common, and what makes them
inadequate as far as helping us live our lives, is that they imagine rationality and emotion
as fundamentally opposing forces. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, does not equate reason
and virtue with emotion, but rather allows and encourages the former to help structure the
latter. This collaboration, if you will, allows for a greater understanding of our emotional
connections with one another, and for love’s central contributions to human flourishing.

III.

Connection, Meaning, and the Loving Principle of Charity
An essential ingredient of love is our emotional connection to the object of our love,

whether that is another person, a project, or ourselves. In this section, I will endeavor to
show the ways in which virtue ethics actively supports such an emotional connection. In
doing so, I refer to Susan Wolf’s Meaning in Life and Why It Matters. Her theory overlaps
in many important ways with this thesis, and though I will not detail all of them here, I
believe it provides a near-perfect framework for the first aspect of virtuous love:
meaningful connection. In a sense, virtuous love actually fixes a difficulty in her
framework: Wolf spends some time characterizing objective worth, but might do well to
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use the virtues for this, as that seems to be the direction in which her theory is headed
anyway.
For the sake of brevity, I will move relatively quickly to her theory before adding
an amendment that will tie it into my purposes in this section. Wolf begins with a discussion
of what she calls “reasons of love,” which are exactly the sort of reasons which I have
demonstrated are out of reach for Kantians and utilitarians. 155 To this exact point, Wolf
illustrates a story about staying up all night sewing a Halloween costume for her daughter:
[In this case] I act neither for egoistic reasons nor for moral ones. I do not
believe that it is better for me that I … forgo hours of much-wanted sleep to
make sure that the wings will stand out at a good angle from the butterfly
costume my daughter wants to wear in the next day’s parade. But neither do
I believe myself duty-bound to perform these acts, or fool myself into
thinking that by doing them I do what will be best for the world. I act neither
out of self-interest nor out of duty or any other sort of impersonal or
impartial reason. Rather, I act out of love. 156
Acting for such reasons bring meaning in life, Wolf argues, in such a way that a moral
framework founded on maximizing utility or acting from duty cannot grasp. However, as
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, love alone does not guarantee virtue or
flourishing. To say that it does would be naïve and lean toward a Humean argument.
Rather, for Wolf, meaning in life comes from what she calls her Fitting Fulfillment
View. 157 I will now proceed to outline that argument, and tie it back into virtuous love.
Wolf’s criteria for a project 158 to be meaningful to the person who undertakes it are
the following: the project must be something for which they have a deep personal interest
or attraction, which has some value independent of themselves (about which they might be
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mistaken); these two must be brought together by emotional engagement. 159 I’ll begin with
the subjective fulfillment requirement, as Wolf does. She outlines the Fulfillment View:
simply put, it states that if a person has a passion, then they should pursue that passion to
the best of their abilities. As Wolf mentions, this is different from pure hedonism, in that
it’s not strictly a pleasure-seeking way of living life, but rather, could entail setbacks and
disappointments. The idea here is that, if someone is doing something they really love, then
they’ll likely be willing to put up with some difficulties to do it. As Wolf writes, “the fact
that most of us would willingly put up with a great deal of stress, anxiety, and vulnerability
to pain in order to pursue our passions can be seen as providing support for the idea that
fulfillment is indeed a great and distinctive good in life” (15). This begins to get at
MacIntyre’s idea of internal goods. When we really dedicate ourselves to something, be it
chess or swimming or something else, we begin to realize the great benefits to ourselves
of doing so, for us. We realize that we feel more accomplished, satisfied, elated, at having
discovered those internal goods and at the process of self-improvement. At this point,
however, Wolf starts to wonder, and I with her, why do we think that this life stops short
of meaning? While subjective fulfillment and the personal attainment of internal goods
(“loving what you do,” to use a clichéd idiom) is important, these cannot adequately
constitute meaning or virtuous love; the individually gratifying nature of these activities
alone means that they are, at best, a part of the picture, and at worst, motivation to do things
distinctly meaningless and even vicious. 160 For example, to love swimming or chess
without a concept of the virtues and how those should structure that love might lead a
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person to cheat or do whatever else is within their means to secure their ends in the game.
Think of any of the examples of professional athletes using performance-enhancing drugs;
surely, something is missing from their love of their sport that leads them to make such
decisions. In the way that subjective fulfillment needs objective worth to be constitutive of
meaning, passionate love requires the virtues to be constitutive of virtuous love. I now turn
to that aspect of Wolf’s argument, and to the completion of the picture of virtuous love.
Wolf’s requirement of objective worth is relatively open-ended: “the point is to
recommend that one get involved … with something the value of which is independent of
and has its source outside of oneself” (19). Meaning can’t only be about oneself, and
projects that are individually fulfilling; it must reach beyond, to projects whose value is
separate from one’s involvement in it. For example, one could think about high school
United States history teacher: their work as a teacher clearly has some value outside of
whatever it gives them individually. Each of their pupils likely learned about the history of
the Atlantic slave trade; without that, those students would be considerably less wellequipped to understand many culturally-ingrained and ongoing aspects of modern racism
in the US, which find their roots in the slave trade. According to Wolf, this teacher’s project
of educating their students has objective worth, value that was clearly outside of
themselves. At this point, Wolf brings in mention of engagement. If this history teacher
were teaching simply because they loved the sound of their own voice, without any care
for the development of their students, Wolf argues that we would be inclined to write their
actions off as considerably less meaningful, or perhaps even meaningless, even if their
students still left with a better understanding of slavery. The objective worth of this
teacher’s class (the student’s improved understanding) on its own cannot be constitutive of
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meaning. Thus, Wolf writes, it is integrally important for meaning that the teacher be
“emotionally engaged with the people or things or activities that make what [he was] doing
valuable” (21). This notion of engagement combines the concepts of subjective fulfillment
and objective worth to form her Fitting Fulfillment View: one without the other does not
create meaning, and engagement ties them together.
Likewise, we can think about virtuous love this way: the acquisition of internal
goods in a loving relationship between any two things cannot be one-sided, but rather must
be intimately intertwined in the relationship between the two things. Virtuous love entails
not only one’s love of a project at work, a hobby, or a relationship, but also the engagement
that one has with the relevant virtues. It cannot be solely about taking and learning what
the good is for oneself but must involve actively and persistently asking, what is the good
for this relationship? Virtuous love, and therefore the type of love that is partially
constitutive of flourishing, cannot simply be the passionate kind that we feel, or our own
internal connection to what we are doing, but must involve a commitment to virtues like
patience, humility, thoughtfulness, and more. On the other hand, a connection
characterized only by the virtues will not be part of a person’s flourishing. To go back to
the swimming or chess examples, all the awards and victory in the world would not be
meaningful to a swimmer or a chess player if there were not a substantial degree of
subjective fulfillment that each got from their respective activities; likewise, if they
exercise the virtues in their activity but have no love of said activity, then it is unlikely to
contribute to their flourishing. The exercise of the virtues is what makes a loving
connection meaningful and what gives it external value.
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As alluded to in the above paragraph, neither subjective fulfillment nor objective
worth on their own would be sufficient for Wolf’s Fitting Fulfillment View of meaning.
Fulfillment alone would be vapid, self-serving, and ultimately meaningless due to its lack
of value to anyone outside of oneself, meanwhile if someone is not passionate about
something that’s objectively valuable, Wolf would argue that it’s unlikely to give them a
great deal of meaning in their life. Both must be present to be meaning-giving. Similarly,
with virtuous love, it can neither be a singular love of a project, for this entails blindness
to any sense of what that love means for others and is not too far removed from hedonism,
nor can it be solely of value outside oneself, for that would be more akin to Kant’s unfeeling
sense of duty. The two must be woven together to form the fabric of virtuous love,
thoughtfully connected to each other, so that the virtues inform the love and the love, in
turn, gives great reason for the virtues. Virtuous love might be construed as a virtuous
positive feedback loop that brings benefits, amidst shared struggles, to both entities. In
other words, the internal goods one uncovers in a loving relationship must be considered
through the lens of the virtues; considered as such, it will be impossible that those goods
are internal to only one half of that relationship.
In Wolf’s Fitting Fulfillment View, she argues that there must be an important
causal link between the passion that we derive from a project (our love of that project) and
its worth outside of what we assign to it ourselves (the virtues that we use to structure that
love). 161 We need to see our project as worthwhile from an external perspective (to be
“proud” of ourselves, as Wolf writes) in addition to having our own strong passion for it.
Furthermore, she writes: “Our interest in living a meaningful life is not an interest in a life
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feeling a certain way, but rather an interest that it be a certain way, specifically, that it be
one that can be appropriately appreciated, admired, or valued by others; that it be a life that
contributes to or realizes or connects in some positive way with independent value.” 162 So,
in Wolf’s view, it’s vitally important that these be actively connected, because if they’re
not, we may only feel like we lead a meaningful life instead of genuinely living a
meaningful life, which comes from the life’s value outside of ourselves. It is easy to see
the parallels with Aristotle, MacIntyre, and Annas here: Aristotle wrote that happiness is
an “activity of the soul,” 163 emphasizing the active nature of both happiness and virtue;
MacIntyre’s concept of practices and Annas’ of skill-building both do as well. So, we may
conceive of the virtues as providing the objective value of a loving relationship, and both
sides of a relationship must be actively engaged in those virtues in our love. A relationship
must genuinely be virtuous, from both sides, i.e. characterized by patience, humility,
thoughtfulness, courage, and honesty, in order to be truly constitutive of virtuous love and
therefore a part of human flourishing.
At this point, a clarification of one of Wolf’s points is in order. Wolf spends a
significant portion of her book making the argument that a project is made meaningful in
part by its objective worth. Because of this, she identifies objective worth quite widely, as
value from outside of oneself. 164 I suggest that she would do well to use the virtues as the
source of this objective worth. A virtuous person’s projects will be valuable to others
because the virtues necessitate this; the virtuous person recognizes that their own
flourishing necessarily happens in concert with those around them. While no one is a
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finished product, the mere fact of working to be more virtuous, to better embody patience,
courage, and the rest of the virtues, will ensure that a project has value outside of oneself.
Taking a third-person view on our loving relationships may help us to see them as they
really are and understand the degree to which they are or are not representative of virtuous
love, and thus how we may improve them. Thus, I agree with Wolf’s argument, and think
it is imminently applicable to the theory of love which I have tried to detail here: love and
subjective fulfillment, at their roots, come from our own desires, but must be shaped by an
active engagement with the virtues so as to create value outside of what we assign them; a
commitment to the virtues are what give projects objective worth.
Through this discussion of Wolf’s work, I believe I have outlined the first aspect of
virtuous love – meaningful connection – and begun to touch upon the second, which is the
loving principle of charity. I will now elaborate on that second point. In philosophy, when
we critique the argument of another author, this principle is integral to treating others’ ideas
respectfully and also strengthening our own argument. It ensures respect of others’
arguments because it asks us to assume the best from them. If another person’s work is not
perfectly clear, the principle of charity asks us to interpret it as if it were clearer. Doing so
prevents us from the making others’ arguments into straw men, that is, the
misrepresentation of their arguments as unduly weak. Preventing this means that we take
their argument seriously and are respectful of the work and thought put into it. In turn,
putting ourselves up against the strongest argument possible makes our own arguments
stronger, because it asks us to find better reasons and more coherent logic than we might
use against a straw man.

Chapter 3

93

The principle of charity I introduce is a bit different, but it is in the same vein. When
we apply the loving principle of charity, we choose to take others in the best light possible.
The loving principle of charity calls on us to see the possibilities that another person’s
actions toward us are not necessarily as bad as they might first appear. Consider an excerpt
from David Foster Wallace’s 2005 commencement speech at Kenyon College, This Is
Water. In the speech, Wallace asks us to think about the banal existence of everyday life
and the petty frustrations that go along with it, particularly with regard to the way we see
other people. Before the following excerpt, he has just listed off a number of unlikely
possibilities about why the other people around us are acting the way they are (that is,
imperfectly):
Of course, none of this is likely, but it's also not impossible — it just
depends on what you want to consider. If you're automatically sure that you
know what reality is and who and what is really important — if you want to
operate on your default-setting — then you, like me, will not consider
possibilities that aren't pointless and annoying. But if you've really learned
how to think, how to pay attention, then you will know you have other
options. 165
Wallace puts the point a little more strongly than I would like to, but the point he makes is
salient here and generally encapsulates what the loving principle of charity asks us to do:
when another person acts in a way that we do not like, it is on us to pause before reacting,
to take a second to consider the underlying reasons why a person might have said or done
that thing that way. Essentially, the principle of charity asks us to make a significant
attempt to understand those with whom we interact instead of leaping to snap judgments;
it asks us to imagine the best from other people and respond in a way that is reflective of
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that. In this sense, it is really just an extension of the virtuous characterization of loving
connection, leaning particularly on the virtues of patience and humility, to not assume that
we know exactly what a person means or intends the second we hear them speak or see
them act and thus to give ourselves a second to really consider what actually might be
underlying their action.
One worry might be that this principle opens us up to abusive relationships, to being
taken advantage of, but this is not the case. When we step back to really try to put ourselves
in another’s shoes and make a genuine attempt to understand them, it also works to help us
understand when another person might be manipulating or abusing us. By considering the
relevant history and background, as well as giving ourselves time to react, we can come to
understand that someone’s actions really are malicious toward us, if they are. At the end of
this chapter, I will get back into this idea, applied to situations when virtuous love might
call on us to love someone who is transgressing or oppressing us even through those forces.
For now, the key takeaway is this: the loving principle of charity calls on us to search for
a deeper understanding of another’s actions, or of a situation, and to postpone judgment
and reaction until we have done so. In much the same way that the philosophical principle
of charity makes our argument stronger, the loving principle of charity strengthens our
response to others and to adverse situations by helping focus our virtues.
In this section, I have touched upon the first two aspects of virtuous love:
meaningful connection and the loving principle of charity. Wolf’s thoughtful
characterization has helped formulate the structure of virtuous love as meaningful
connection, involving passion for a project – be it a relationship, a hobby, or work –
intimately connected with the application of the virtues to that passion. Discussion of
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Wolf’s framework as well as an improvement to it – using virtue as the mechanism for
objective worth – led to the loving principle of charity, which further structures our
interactions, particularly loving ones, with virtue. The intent has been to paint a picture of
virtuous love, not as an oxymoron, as it might be if we were to adopt a Kantian, Humean,
or utilitarian perspective, but as the latter necessitating the former. In the next section, I
apply this framework to different types of love, to help illustrate the ways in which virtuous
love forms an essential part of flourishing.

IV.

Loving and Flourishing
Recall from the previous chapter a few things: first, remember that relationship,

and particularly friendship, is a key part of the concept of practices. When we learn to be
honest in the principal’s office, an internal good of that practice – which is going to the
principal’s office and telling the truth, even though it may result in disciplinary
consequences – is the possibility of relationship (and therefore the likelihood that the child
will not break the rules and get in trouble again) that opens up upon the genuine embrace
of that practice, and is inaccessible otherwise. Further remember the necessity that Aristotle
places on friendship, “for no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all
the other goods.” 166 Friendship is emblematic of the virtuous love discussed in this chapter.
Third, and finally, remember the idea, as touched upon in the previous chapter and again
in this one, that flourishing comes from striving to be more virtuous, and that virtuous love
strives to be ever better and therefore flourishes itself. Virtuous love, or a meaningful
connection that involves passion shaped by virtue and the loving principle of charity, is

166

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 119

96

DeRuff

one of the greatest ways we can flourish. In what remains of this chapter, I will go through
some examples of different kinds of love to show that virtuous love makes possible a
brilliant human flourishing unlike any other. Like the virtues, the different types of love
feed off of and reinforce each other; also like the virtues, to love virtuously is to work at
loving virtuously, to constantly seek to better that love in concert with the object of that
love. Hopefully, an exploration of the different kinds of love will help to draw out more
specifically the theory of this chapter.
First, take the example of romantic love. This evokes perhaps the most powerful
passions that we can think of. This sort of love, in so many stories, in film and on paper, is
constantly invoked to make us think of the sacrifices that a partner makes for the other, the
pain and suffering that one endures for the other, an emotion so strong that one person
would go to the end of the earth for the other and likewise. While sacrifice on behalf of
one’s partner is not inherently bad, we need to identify whether they are virtuous, and
therefore are part of the good for the relationship. When we apply the virtues to love, they
ask us to be patient, to treat our partner with the loving principle of charity, and to be
courageous and vulnerable with our partner. But the virtues, especially patience, humility,
thoughtfulness, courage, and honesty, help us to form our loving relationship. When we
are patient, thoughtful, and we make use of the loving principle of charity, we are mindful
to not form immediate judgments, but rather to thoughtfully step back from the object of
our love and ask the questions in the above paragraph: what is the good right now? Is what
I am/we are doing helping us toward that? If the answer to the second question is no, then
self-sacrifice may not be the best or most virtuous option. On the other hand, if the answer
is yes, then sacrifice may be warranted, provided it does not always fall on one partner or
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the other to make that sacrifice. It is not as if a relationship is a series of one-off gametheoretic interactions, in which we separate one from another. Relationships are a
continuum of decisions, and if that continuum is not virtuous, i.e. if it is unbalanced,
requiring sacrifice from one partner and not the other consistently, then it cannot possibly
be a flourishing relationship. 167 Inevitably, romantic relationships are imperfect. They will
be unbalanced in some way or another. But the virtues ask us to continually evaluate them,
to press forward toward what is mutually defined as the good for the relationship, as
opposed to solely for one partner or the other. Love in romantic relationships often begins
with an intense passion, yet it requires the ongoing, virtuous efforts of both partners to be
sustain it, to make it healthy, and help it flourish; it cannot be a one-sided effort.
Much of the same could be said for one’s platonic love of a friend: it is maintained
and improved with the virtues and a consistent re-evaluation, and, if necessary, rehabituation toward flourishing. Sometimes that will require one person or another to make
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changes to themselves to be more patient, more thoughtful, or otherwise more virtuous in
the name of helping the relationship to flourish and the other person with it. Of course, no
loving relationship would be possible without honesty – each person must share openly
with the other, and only when they do will the internal goods of the loving relationship
(namely, the feeling of deep connection, trust, and belonging with the other person) be
open to them.
Next, think about love of self. Clearly, infatuation with oneself is not what I wish
to advocate here. This sort of unflinching, unquestioning love would not be healthy, nor
would it help a person to flourish, as it would cut off genuine relationship with others, as
well as preventing the person from realizing the internal goods that come from a healthy,
virtuous relationship with themselves. Such a relationship will be defined by many of the
same virtues that define a virtuous romantic or platonic relationship, such as humility or
courage, but in important ways, forms the basis on which those relationships rest. Virtuous
love of other people is something that comes out of virtuous love for oneself. For example,
a person must first be honest with themselves if they are to be honest and vulnerable with
others, both of which are conditions of loving relationships; if they do not know
themselves, they will not be able to genuinely share themselves with others. Self-love,
then, can be thought of in much the same way as the other forms of love, but with perhaps
an even higher importance, for those other loves must have as their basis a love of self from
both parties. Virtuous self-love also calls on us to be kind to ourselves, to be patient when
we make mistakes instead of automatically admonishing ourselves; at the same time, it
requires that we constantly seek to improve that self-love: we must simultaneously accept
ourselves as we are and also strive to improve as people. It is that self – the self that is self-
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loving through the lens of virtue – which we must then reflect outward if we are to truly
discover the internal goods of loving relationship. So, whether love is between two people
or for oneself, it must hold true to the structure laid out in this chapter: it must entail
meaningful connection (in the case of self-love, a genuine liking of oneself and the virtues
that underlie that), the application of the principle of charity, and the striving for
improvement that is constitutive of flourishing.
Another form of love that is important for our lives is familial love. This might
seem to represent an issue for this framework, as there is no choice involved in who one’s
family is, but if this is an issue, then it also applies to self-love, as we have no choice but
to live with ourselves. It would certainly be an issue for the sentimentalist, who, like David
Hume, argues that our ethical theory comes from our passions. But if we cannot choose
our family but rather grow up with them, and our ethical theory comes from our passions,
then it seems like we forgo all choice in how we treat our family. I reject this; I do not
purport to argue that we choose to love our family, but rather that that love will be most
meaningful, most constitutive of flourishing, when it is virtuous. As with our partners,
friends, and ourselves, familial love is improved when it is underwritten by the virtues.
This might be the easiest type of love to take for granted, because it is often there without
any work on our part. However, this is precisely why it is paramount to exercise the virtues
in familial love. If love within the family is not virtuous, it will be most conducive to abuse
because of the assumption that it will always be there. As with the other kinds of love
already discussed, familial love must be virtuous to be maintained and improved, and
therefore to flourish.
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Love of what one does, as discussed in the section on Wolf, must be structured by
the virtues in the same way as any of the above types of love. The example of the athlete
using performance-enhancing drugs shows one side of a vicious love for one’s work;
another, using a similar example, would be if an athlete’s love of their sport leads them to
pour everything they have into it. Normally, this is regarded as a good thing by sports
announcers, as they say things like: “Her life is the game.” Yet, this sort of love could not
be virtuous as it entails blinders to the goods across one’s life. If someone loves only their
sport, it could eat them alive, causing them to forgo all the other important aspects of their
life, most especially relationships. A star soccer player might be excellent on the field, but
if their love of the game leads to a neglect of the other areas of their life, it will be nearly
impossible for them to flourish. Thus, while the athlete may focus especially in one area or
another, the same way anyone with a passion does, they must do so virtuously, applying
the lessons learned on the field to the other areas of their life. Relying on one’s teammates
or sharing the ball, so to speak, is just as important in life and in one’s relationships as it is
on the soccer field. Furthermore, virtuous love, as I have argued, allows love to be
sustainable. Leading a balanced, virtuous life can feed a steady flame of an athletic career
or another demanding profession, while the large flame of a sole focus is more likely to
burn out quickly, consuming all of a person’s fuel without allowing it to replenish.
The different forms of love, while indicative of differing circumstances, positions
in life, and degrees of accessibility based on the prior two factors, share in common the
need to be structured by the virtues. If they are not, they are susceptible to obsession or
abuse, to excesses and deficiencies, as Aristotle would say, and as such cannot be
constitutive of flourishing. Moments of joy, pleasure, elation, and other strong passions are
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valuable, yes, but enduring flourishing will not be possible without the virtues. Before
examining two more types of love – the moral love of all things and the love of those who
harm oneself, or radical love – I will consider the type of loving outlook that can arise from
virtuous love, and the ways it can feed back into itself, thus putting us in the position for
more moments of (as well as lasting) joy and elation. Critical to this loving outlook will be
the concept of habituation, of learning and progressive development.

V.

Learning to Love
An important aspect of flourishing has been largely left aside in this chapter. In the

examples at the end of the previous section, I argued that love of all kinds must be
structured by the virtues. I made arguments along the lines of: “virtuous love must be
honest,” and “virtuous love must adhere to the principle of charity,” and “virtuous love
must strive to improve at these things.” This may seem obvious to the point of being
unnecessary to write. It is perhaps less obvious, however, how exactly we may get to
virtuous love, but virtue ethics gives us the answer. It reminds us that, because virtuous
love is characterized by the virtues, like honesty and humility and patience and courage, it
must be learned. This point is imminently easy to forget; it is easier to say that virtues must
be this way or that than to think about how they come to be that way. Yet virtuous love is
not just an innate way of being. It requires successes and failures, the way any practice
does. Remember Aristotle’s focus on habituation: “We learn a craft by producing the same
product that we must produce when we have learned it; we become builders, for instance,
by building, and we become harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, then, we become just
by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave
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actions.” 168 Likewise, we become better and more virtuous lovers by loving; we realize the
mistakes we make and work to correct them, often in conjunction with another person, as
well as realizing the goods internal to virtuous love. Once we learn to love virtuously, the
internal goods will often speak for themselves, and lead us to love more, but it is critical
that we maintain the virtuous basis of that love.
A virtuous and flourishing relationship is characterized by a dedication to
constantly making it better. This does not, of course, guarantee that every virtuous romantic
relationship will end in a happy marriage. Rather, it may help people to realize that they
should not be together after all, that they would actually be better off as friends or otherwise
separated. Virtue helps us to flourish as people, and virtuous love helps us to flourish in
relationship with other people and things around us; it does not guarantee one specific
outcome or another. Love is messy! It involves hurt and heartache and pain, as well as joy
and celebration and elation. What the virtues do for love is to help structure it, not to take
away the intensity of it or diminish the emotionality of it, but to help us understand it,
sustain it (when it is right to do so), and improve it through the process of learning (even
if that means ending a specific relationship). Since loving well is a learning process, it also
often means that we need mentors or teachers to make our way through that process.
Sometimes those may be the person with whom we are in relationship, while at other times
they may be someone external to a given relationship, like a parent, sibling, friend, coach,
religious leader, or counselor. The point is that, by and large, we do not learn to love
virtuously on our own. Others around us often help us identify the internal goods of
virtuous, loving relationships and give us guidance in those relationships.
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In a way, this constitutes our continuation of moral traditions; when we love
virtuously, we honor those who came before in that practice. At the same time, we can
inherit moral traditions that lead us astray of the virtues, and upon recognizing this, often
through the recognition that our practices are not revealing the internal goods we thought
they should, we rehabituate towards practices that will. We often seek guidance in this
process of rehabituation; for example, consider the addict who realizes that their love of a
drug cannot sustain them nor lead to flourishing, and have led to the destruction of their
relationships. This is akin to the type of situation Annas argues may lead a person to
develop the will to change their disposition, and thus to seek out the guidance of a good
teacher. 169 There is a key word in the previous sentence, which ties into the notion of a
loving outlook; that word is “will.”
Whether in a difficult situation such as addiction or a good one, like a strong,
virtuous relationship, the virtues create a positive feedback loop with love. When a person
realizes the internal goods that come only by way of virtuous love, such as a meaningful
connection with others or with one’s work, or the feeling of self-confidence or confidence
in a relationship that come with the puzzling through of a particularly puzzling issue, they
will of course hope to have more of that in their lives, and the lives of those around them.
So, the natural next step would be to extend that virtuous love outward, to treat more people
with more respect, thoughtfulness, and the other virtues, and to make the effort to see others
with the principle of charity, that is, to extend love, to the extent one can, to situations and
people ahead of time, much the way the 92-year-old woman does in the parable that began
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this chapter. In a way, this “will to love,” so to speak, somewhat resembles William James’
argument in “The Will to Believe.” James writes that religious faith comes from the belief
in hypotheses (e.g. that God exists) that strike us as “live”; that is, hypotheses that connect
with us as genuinely possible for us. 170 Likewise, for Mrs. Jones, she has two options: she
can be sad about moving into the nursing home and do so only begrudgingly, or she can
embrace a loving outlook, to choose to believe ahead of time that her room and her
experience at the nursing home will be wonderful. And, in doing so, it is much more likely,
because she will have embraced the virtues ahead of time, the love ahead of time, that she
will be satisfied and that her virtuous, loving outlook will realize in the form of a wonderful,
flourishing experience for her.
Before moving onto the next chapter, which will focus on a place in which exactly
this sort of loving outlook is cultivated and rewarded, I wish to briefly discuss two more
distinct types of love. The first is the moral love which extends to all living things. Kant
argues that this comes from reason, and the universal maxim that we cannot engage in any
actions that would not be possible for everyone. Yet this is a simply practical love, and has
no emotional basis. When we actively choose a loving outlook (probably as a byproduct of
realizing the internal goods of experiencing virtuous love), it becomes natural to extend
our love to more and more people, regardless of where they come from or what they
believe. Embracing a loving outlook comes with the recognition that, when it comes down
to it, love is what binds us all together. Take an example from Brené Brown’s research on
belonging, in which she discusses the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in Houston:
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There we are, six feet of water in our street… You have the Cajun navy,
which is 400 fishermen and women coming from Louisiana in swamp boats
and jet skis and fishing boats, pulling people out of houses. Never once
during this tragedy… did someone say, “Hey, I’m here to help. Who did
you vote for?” 171
She then goes on to describe the shared, widespread jubilation throughout Houston when
the Astros 172 went on to win the 2017 World Series. At the end of the day, when boundaries
like political ideology are broken down, what remains, Brown says, is love. The person
with the loving outlook, then, is perfectly prepared for this, and actually helps to bring it
about. They understand the primacy of love in our interactions, and the fact that, in order
to be sustained beyond the immediate response to a disaster or celebration, to entail the sort
of long-lasting flourishing for which we all hope, their loving outlook needs to be supported
by the virtues. In similar irony to the above point about Kant, the spread of this loving
outlook will also likely ensure the greatest overall happiness. So it seems, for Kant or Mill,
the best path, albeit a less straightforward one, to the realization of their moral standards
just might be through virtuous love. However, as I have mentioned on numerous occasions,
neither of their theories are equipped to guide us to that love.
This brings me the final type of love that I will discuss, which is perhaps the most
controversial. This is the example of “love in action,” as United States Congressman John
Lewis calls it, 173 which is the love of those who harm you. This notion, also called radical
love, extends far back into history before Lewis practiced it in the United States Civil
Rights movement of the mid-twentieth century, to Gandhi and Thoreau and, for many, to
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the life of Jesus or other religious leaders who were persecuted. 174 On the topic of this kind
of love in the Civil Rights movement, Lewis says:
The movement created what I like to call a nonviolent revolution. It was
love at its best. It’s one of the highest forms of love. That you beat me, you
arrest me, you take me to jail, you almost kill me, but in spite of that, I’m
gonna still love you. 175
How could this love still be virtuous? After all, does it not open a person up to exactly the
type of abuse that virtues are supposed to protect against? This is most probably the furthest
deviation from what I have typically meant by virtuous love in this chapter. Yet it is still,
critically, shaped by virtue, in the most aspirational sense possible. Radical love, as
practiced in nonviolent revolutions the world over throughout much of history, seeks to
demonstrate the principles of virtuous love even as it is confronted with precisely the
opposite. In the face of violence and oppression, radical love maintains respect, honesty,
thoughtfulness of response, and especially courage. It is structured as such so as to tear
down the type of boundaries we have built up against it (in the context of the Civil Rights
movement, these were bigotry, segregation, and racism), and it relies on a firm commitment
to the virtues to give it the moral high ground. Because the virtues have been outlined
through time and developed and improved, when radical love is grounded in those virtues,
it can be identified intertemporally as being in the name of flourishing. It also serves the
purpose of calling those who disagree with it to reexamine their own commitment to the
virtues; it could be construed as an educational form of love. For example, a white person
in the Civil Rights era might have reexamined whether the respect they argue should be
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afforded only to other white people is really compatible with the virtue of respect, taken on
its own. This is by no means the guaranteed reaction, but love is not based on outcomes.
A pair of examples may help to illustrate the workings of radical love and the
necessity of virtue in that love. First, consider Timothy McVeigh, the terrorist who bombed
the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168 people. 176 McVeigh
saw himself as a revolutionary, and loved his country, but thought that “the government
had declared war against the American people.” 177 His love of the country, while radical,
was not virtuous by any means; virtue requires respect of other human beings, recognition
that we are all of one yoke, and a consideration of the good in any scenario, all three of
which are mutually exclusive with the taking of lives, barring seriously extenuating
situations. 178 Radical, virtuous love add to and improve our connection to each other, not
destroy it.
A second example may help bring radical love into our everyday lives. Consider
anyone who is a parent 179 – day after day, raising their children, they are faced with actions
of their children that may be totally thoughtless. Small children may do or say things
without intent of hurting their parents, yet due to their lack of filter, may be incredibly
hurtful. Adolescents, on the other hand, may do or say things with the specific intent of
hurting their parents, and may be successful in doing so. In these situations, and so many
more, parents exercise radical love. Despite pain and hurt (intentional or not), they love
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their children anyway. If the child is to grow to develop a sense of virtuous love, then that
is the parent’s only option: to love anyway, to love patiently and courageously in spite of
the words and actions of their children. That does not entail forgoing honesty. It is
important for children to understand when they do or say things that hurt their parents, that
that pain exists. If it is hidden, then it is born only by the parents themselves. Furthermore,
if a parent responds to hurtful language or actions reciprocally, the child will learn that that
is the correct or justified course of action. If it is shown, if the parents are vulnerable, the
children may learn and improve, becoming more loving. Unless a child is sadistic or
abusive, a parent must relentlessly continue to practice radical, virtuous love.
When people act with radical, virtuous love, they help us understand the primacy
of love over all other identifiers and distinctions. More than any universal maxim or utilitymaximizing calculation, a commitment to virtuous love across all scenarios is the closest
we can get to the sort of moral love that recognizes the value of all people. 180 As Bell
Hooks writes in all about love, “A love ethic [which she defines as ‘showing care, respect,
knowledge, integrity, and the will to cooperate] presupposes that everyone has the right to
be free, to live fully and well.” 181
In sum, virtuous love can be characterized by three concepts. First, it can be
helpfully broken down as a meaningful connection, which entails not only passionate love
but also an active engagement with the virtues. This ensures that love is always growing
and becoming more virtuous, leading to ongoing flourishing. The second concept is the
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loving principle of charity, which encourages us to take a step back, particularly when
people act in ways that initially frustrate us, to get a clearer picture of why a person may
be acting in the way they are. Third, as a summation of the other two, virtuous love is
constitutive of flourishing. This is made evident across the many different forms of love,
each of which is sustained and strengthened by the virtues. When we love virtuously, we
are better partners, better friends, and better to ourselves and our family members. When
we allow those loves to grow and flourish, they lead to the development of a virtuous,
loving outlook, which extends past those with whom we have close relationships and
makes possible a moral love of all humans 182 as well as the radical love of virtuous
revolutionaries and parents alike. Virtuous love feeds on itself, leading us to become more
virtuous and more loving all the time.
The next chapter is an ethnographic case study, an examination of a place where a
virtuous, loving outlook is taught, cultivated, and habituated. In this place, a summer camp
in Vermont, a particular emphasis is placed on exactly what I outlined at the beginning of
the final section of this chapter: the idea that virtuous love often includes failure,
improvement, success, and more failure. Learning to love virtuously helps us to flourish as
people and in relationship, and to do that, we need to learn how. Lanakila is a paradigmatic
example of a place that does just that.
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Or even all living beings!

4
I.

The School of Virtuous Love
Making Time for Growth: A Daily Schedule Designed for It
When the bugle blows, all of the campers flow into the dining hall in a frenzied

rush; the energy of the day is well underway, though most of the counselors are yawning
and already halfway through their first cup of coffee. 183 The director, who goes only by his
nickname and never by his given name, utters the first words of the morning, a think-piece
chosen for that day in particular:
The 92-year-old, petite, well-poised, and proud lady, who is fully dressed
each morning by eight o’clock, with her hair fashionably coifed and makeup
perfectly applied, even though she is legally blind, moved to a nursing home
today. Her husband of 70 years recently passed away, making the move
necessary.
After many hours of waiting patiently in the lobby of the nursing home, she
smiled sweetly when told her room was ready. As she maneuvered her
walker to the elevator, I provided a visual description of her tiny room,
including the eyelet curtains that had been hung on her window. “I love it!”
she stated with the enthusiasm of an eight-year-old having just been
presented with a new puppy. “Mrs. Jones, you haven’t seen the room… just
wait.”
“That doesn’t have anything to do with it,” she replied. “Happiness is
something you decided on ahead of time. Whether I like my room or not
doesn’t depend on how the furniture is arranged; it’s how I arrange my
mind. I already decided to love it. It’s a decision I make every morning
183

The following account of a day at Camp Lanakila is the author’s retelling of a day in the summer of 2016.
Much of this chapter will rely on a first-person ethnography of the camp, with as much of an eye toward
objectivity as possible.
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when I wake up. I have a choice; I can spend the day in bed recounting the
difficulty I have with the parts of my body that no longer work, or get out
of bed and be thankful for the ones that do. Each day is a gift, and as long
as my eyes open, I’ll focus on the new and happy memories I’ve stored
away – just for this time in my life. 184
A silence ensues, some 300 minds pondering on what it means for a 92-year-old woman to
make a choice about living her life with a loving attitude. The director asks everyone to
enjoy their meals, and like that, the day has officially begun. Loud, joyful chatter fills the
dining hall, and thirty minutes or so into the meal, even the sleepiest of counselors is alive
with an inexorable sort of enthusiasm that can only be attributed to a combination of
pancakes lathered in syrup, healthy doses of coffee, and a genuine excitement for the
adventure of the day. The day at Camp Lanakila has begun. 185
The words of the story ring true in my ears and at my table, we spend a good ten or
fifteen minutes discussing them. The boys around the table have a surprising amount to say
about what the parable is telling us. One of them, an eleven-year-old from Los Angeles
who happens to live in my cabin, thinks that the story is about being grateful for what you
have. A last-year camper, fifteen years old and from North Carolina, thinks for a second
before agreeing, then adds: “I think it’s also about making a decision about how you want
to feel. Your outlook going into something makes up a lot of how you feel about it.” The
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Excerpt from “Focusing the Day: Lanakila Morning Readings.” Author Unknown.
To get some sense of the place, I have included photos from Lanakila’s website in the appendix to this
thesis. Some quick facts about the camp may also be useful. Lanakila is a boys’ sleepaway camp in Fairlee,
Vermont, and during the summer is the home to 170 boys, ages eight to fifteen, as well as around 110
counselors, about three-quarters of whom are men and the other quarter of whom are women. The camp was
founded in 1922 and has run continuously ever since; it is part of the greater Aloha Foundation, which is a
collection of six organizations which serve different populations: Aloha and Aloha Hive serve older and
younger girls, respectively; Horizons is a day camp that serves the local community; Ohana is a family camp
that runs for mixed-generation groups throughout the summer; Hulbert is an outdoor center with year-round
programming for schools and other organizations. Each summer at Lanakila, campers spend three and a half
or seven weeks living at the camp. They are divided into four different age group living units, where they
live in tents or cabins, and during the day, have the option to attend many varied activities. For more info,
see: alohafoundation.org/lanakila.
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other counselors and I look at each other, knowing we have just been part of one of those
remarkable moments where the campers understand the philosophy of Lanakila so well
that they do our job for us. Before too long, that conversation has given way to a spirited
debate about which super power is the best. One of the youngest campers in camp, an eightyear-old from the Bronx, passionately defends his desire for super speed. The Flash, he
says, is by far the coolest super hero. Full stop, end of story. The rest of the table concedes
to his vigor, and before too long, breakfast is over and my campers and I head back to
Woodside, the second-youngest of the four age-group living units at Lanakila.
Back in Woodside, my campers and I get to work cleaning our individual areas in
anticipation of Inspection. They share communal jobs like sweeping the floor, taking out
the trash, and cleaning outside the cabin. There is plenty of room for frustration and
sometimes even conflict between cabin mates during Inspection; this is wholly intentional,
and something that we as counselors anticipate and hope to use as moments of growth. At
this point in the summer, though, the boys of Woodside Cabin Three have mostly figured
out how to work together, support each other, and get the cabin clean. In fact, this is their
tenth day passing in a row, and because of that, they have earned a special event: an
overnight! More on that in a bit.
After Inspection, it is my cabin’s turn in the rotation to clean the Wash House, the
most dreaded of the Woodside Pride Jobs. 186 Holding our noses with one hand and toilet
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These are titled as such to reflect the notion of “Woodside Pride,” which the campers discuss and define
at the beginning of each summer. Woodside Pride asks each of us (campers and counselors alike) to ask
ourselves, “Can I be proud of the way I am acting right now? Am I treating my cabin mates, friends in the
unit, the clubhouse, our shared space, etc. with respect?” The Pride Jobs are shared among the different tents
and cabins, so that each rotates through and helps keep the unit clean and healthy. They include cleaning the
wash house, the clubhouse, taking the trash and recycling to the dumpster, going around with the Lost &
Found, and more.
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brushes in the other, the campers and I do not necessarily enjoy every minute of this Pride
Job, but we get it done quickly and effectively so that we have time to play Frisbee golf
around the unit. Ten minutes before 10 am, we gather our Frisbees and return them to the
clubhouse, making sure to put them back neatly, especially since Tent One and Tent Three
just finished cleaning it.
The first period of the day today is Assembly, and everyone is there. As usual, we
begin by singing. The barn, with all three hundred of us in it, shakes as we sing rowdy
classics like “Charlie and the MTA,” “Hi Ho the Rattling Bog,” and “Country Roads.”
Then the mood shifts as Donnie Mac, the oldest counselor at camp (he is somewhere in his
mid-seventies), describes Bob Love, the music director for Lanakila who manned the keys
for forty five years. Love, Donnie explains, came to camp as an adult but embodied
everything the place stands for: he never took himself too seriously and at the same time,
took everyone, from the director of camp down to the youngest camper, as seriously as can
be, because everyone was deserving of his time. With that, we start to sing the next song,
which was added to the songbook when Love retired. The refrain goes: “Love changes
everything”; 187 for me, this belies as much camp philosophy as anything else. Each and
every moment, we get a choice about how we want to react to what is happening around
us, and if we do so with the sort of loving outlook described at the end of the previous
chapter, then our experience of the world really will change. 188 After singing “Bob’s Song,”
as it has come to be known, a counselor presents on how he uses the physics research that
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Camp Lanakila, Songs of Lanakila (Fairlee, VT: Lanakila, 2006), 10. See full lyrics in Appendix.
More discussion on camp philosophy and “changing your picture” in the following section.
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he does outside of camp to learn about the world; Assembly always offers campers and
counselors a chance to learn from each other’s experiences about something new.
The remaining three periods of the day are filled with all sorts of different activities
from which the campers can choose. Each of them visits Swimming once every day, where
they have a chance to work on their swimming skills, practice and test for their ranks (called
“Viking Honors”), 189 enjoy the sun, or hang out on the diving raft. Otherwise, they are free
to choose from the fifteen other departments at Lanakila. They might spend the afternoon
climbing and zipping on the High Ropes course, improving their shooting accuracy in the
Archery department, perfecting their fire-building skills or knots in Camp Craft, or learning
new footwork techniques in soccer from the Athletics counselors. 190 Each and every
department works hard to provide the right mix of fun activities and learning opportunities,
chances to succeed and fail, and to try again. During a day in the departments, there are
ample opportunities for campers to push themselves past what they previously thought was
possible, to resolve conflicts, both internal and external, and to enjoy themselves alongside
their fellow campers and the counselors that guide them.
On this particular evening, I have promised the campers an overnight because they
passed Inspection ten times in a row. However, because of extenuating circumstances, it is
not going to be possible, and it cannot happen later, as we are rapidly nearing the end of
the summer. Instead, my co-counselor and I have pulled together a hodge-podge plan at
the last moment, as often happens at Lanakila, and because our campers are focused on the
fact that they will not be going on an overnight, they are pretty upset. We ask them to trust
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More discussion on ranks in the following section.
The departments (other than those mentioned here) are: Arts, Biking, Boating, Exploring, Music/Drama,
Photography, Riflery, Sailing, Shop, Tennis, and Tripping.
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us, and after some convincing and invocation of the morning reading from breakfast, we
start on a hike into the woods. When we get to where we are going, there is a ten-foot-tall
wall, on the other side of which, unbeknownst to the campers, are a stash of water balloons.
We tell them that, in order to go ahead with the course of action for the night, they will
need to scale the wall, and they are initially upset: “We already passed Inspection ten times
in a row and now we have to do this, too?” After some encouragement from my cocounselor and me, they finally get together and plan how to get over the wall; clearly, it
will involve lots of teamwork, as none of them are nearly large enough to get over on their
own (they are all ten to twelve years old). Eventually, they do get over, and when they do,
they shriek with joy as they soak their counselors and each other with the balloons.
After we all get dried off and warm, it is time for dinner, and tonight’s dinner is a
grab-and-go designed for tents and cabins to spend time with each other. We take our
sandwiches down to the waterfront and out onto the lake in a group of canoes. The day has
been yet another wonderful, up-and-down rollercoaster of excitement and emotions, and
this feels like the perfect way to cap it all off: sitting silently on a glassy lake, watching the
sunset, reveling in the moments that combined together to make this day special, each of
us proud of ourselves for each of the little victories we had over ourselves in the process.
This, I think, as my co-counselor and I exchange a contented smile, is what Lanakila is all
about.
A day at Lanakila provides plenty of room for conversations like the one my table
had at breakfast that are both fun and reflective, as well as opportunities to apply those
conversations to our lives, like my cabin of campers had throughout the day at Inspection,
activities, and during the activities of the evening. In fact, the camp is designed precisely
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around those conversations and their application. A talk given to parents a few years back
famously championed the following slogan: “Lanakila: where you won’t get what you
want.” Whereas much of our modern-day society is geared toward convenience and getting
exactly what we want as soon as possible, through such services as social media (social
gratification) and online shopping (material gratification), Lanakila strives for the opposite.
Of course, campers at Lanakila do also get a lot of what they want; they are at summer
camp on a lake in Vermont, after all. There is a lot of opportunity for fun and plenty of
rewarding activities. What is really important about Lanakila, though, is that it helps boys
restructure their priority of wants. The immediate demands and rewards of the outside
world are replaced with the internal goods of friendship and skill development, and all the
while, the campers and counselors alike develop more and more of the virtuous base for
love of themselves, each other, and the activities in which they participate. In the section
that follows, I will examine in greater detail that which I have tried to give a sense of
anecdotally in this first section of the chapter: the philosophy that goes into making
Lanakila a place for campers and counselors alike to learn to love virtuously and expand
their loving outlook, grow as people, and build virtuous character.

II.

“We Help Create Fine People”: Setting a Virtuous Course
Every summer, as soon as the counselors arrive at Camp Lanakila, the philosophy

has already begun. The first order of business is always introductions: name, number of
years at camp, and the highlight of your year that you are most proud of. A pin drops, and
the respect in the room is palpable; this is no simple order of business but rather a critical
moment of getting to know one another. After introductions, the intentional philosophy
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gets underway as the counselors head to the barn to chart the course for the summer. The
camp carries traditions that date back to its inception in 1922 (such as the stated mission:
“We help create fine people,” as well as the rest of the six primary core values – see
footnote 191), but something unique goes on in the barn on that first day of “pre-camp.” The
director and some of the senior counselors share for a few moments about a theme for the
summer, but then allow the counseling staff to take that theme and run with it, to define it
as they see it and hope to implement it throughout the summer. In so doing, every
counseling staff inherits some things from the history of the camp but also has the freedom
to direct its system of values in the way it sees fit. What results from the brainstorming
session in the barn is that summer’s “vision piece,” a guiding document put together by
senior counselors. In 2017, the first paragraph of the vision piece read:

191

The six core values are:
1. We create fine people.
a. This is perhaps the most important of the core values and underlies everything counselors
do. This is why camp exists: to help campers and counselors alike develop the skills to
flourish
2. There are many ways to be a man.
a. Each of us is different; some of us are artists, others athletes, others intellectuals, many of
us some combination of these and others. There are many ways to be, but all of them
involve a commitment to self-improvement as well as to the virtues.
3. Skol!
a. Skol is a Norse way of saying, “Cheers!” At Lanakila, it is our go-to greeting, but also a
reminder to enjoy the moment and each other’s company.
4. We don’t boo at Lanakila.
a. There are winners and losers in games as well as other situations in life, but this value asks
us to always maintain respect for others. This is one of the most important virtues for us to
hold dear.
5. Leave a campsite better than you found it.
a. While this is a trail ethos that asks us to leave places untouched to the extent we can and
better when we do leave a trace, it is also an ethos of life. This asks us to move through life
conscientiously of others, aware of our impact on those around us, always leaving a place
or person or situation better than we found it/them.
6. Rule #6.
a. This rule asks us to not take ourselves too seriously. There is some humor, some joy, some
light in most situations, and there is great power in discovering these things especially in
difficult situations.
Rules from: Camp Lanakila, Lanakila Counselor Manual 2017 (Fairlee, VT: Lanakila, 2017), 5.
Explanation by the author.
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If we as teachers and mentors were to hold true to our guiding mission –
creating fine people and helping them become their best selves – the
Lanakila experience would last far longer than three-and-a-half or seven
weeks on Lake Morey’s shores. While other institutions tout their
programming as a pinnacle experience for their customers – as the height of
what life can be – we hope that our Lanakila summers serve as launchpads,
propelling campers and counselors onward and upward, with the skills,
outlooks, and beliefs about themselves and the world that we all need to live
remarkably. 192
Thus, from the very outset of each summer, Lanakila’s counseling staff comes together to
produce their shared vision for the summer. This vision, in addition to the enduring themes
of camp from year to year, guide the counseling staff’s interaction in each and every
interaction with the campers they serve, as well as serving as a basis from which to evaluate
one’s own performance as a counselor and a person.
Usually, those vision pieces, as this one does, focus on building the “skills,
outlooks, and beliefs about themselves and the world that we all need to live
remarkably.” 193 That is, the vision pieces focus on building the virtues that campers will
need to succeed at camp and afterward. The opening of the 2015 vision piece echoes this
focus: “We know that the Lanakila environment provides a rare opportunity to teach our
campers some of the most important life lessons they will need to be good, strong, loving
and responsible young men.” 194 In other years, different aspects of the virtue-ethical
framework emphasized in this thesis have been underscored by the vision pieces. In 2016,
the counseling staff emphasized striving, with an allusion to practices: “At Lanakila, our
predominant tool is love, with enough stress built in to create the necessary desire for

192
"2017 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2017 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2017, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.
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Ibid.
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"2015 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2015 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2015, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.

Chapter 4

119

change. The change we speak of involves creating a greater congruency between the people
we are at the moment and the people we want to be: the journey to our best selves.” 195 In
2010, the emphasis was on the relationships necessary for growth, where mentors (or “good
teachers”) model behavior in a community “where aspirations and actions align; where
honesty, integrity, and humor overcome cynicism and fear; and where our noblest dreams
for ourselves and for the world seem not only plausible but can actually come true.” 196 So,
from the outset of each summer, the Lanakila counselors form a commitment to a set of
values about how they will treat each other, the campers, and the institution, based on the
historical traditions of the place as well as each of their lived experiences. Words alone are
not constitutive of virtue; this process of setting the course for the summer is but one of the
many practices that contribute to Lanakila’s pedagogy of flourishing. The next section of
this chapter will be an exploration of some of the other practices and traditions that make
up that pedagogy. Because Lanakila is a complex place with many varied traditions and
practices, I will focus on just a few that I see as emblematic of the framework of virtue
ethics presented in this thesis.

III.

Success Counseling: Teaching Virtue through Practices
At Lanakila, every situation is treated as a chance to grow, to develop the character

required to go out into the outside-of-camp world as a “fine person.” Before understanding
the practices and traditions that go into this, it is necessary to understand the counseling
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"2016 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2016 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2016, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.
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"2010 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2010 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2010, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.
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philosophy that undergirds them all. This philosophy is called success counseling, and is
based on internal control psychology. It is:
The foundation for how we deal with ourselves, others, and the world
around us. It serves as our guiding principle for all of our camps… This
approach gives us a framework for creating a community where campers
and counselors aspire to serve others as a way to strengthen themselves. 197
Success counseling asks six questions, designed to provoke reflection and solutiongeneration:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What do you want?
What are you doing?
Is it working?
What do you see as your options now?
What is your next step?
Is it closer to what you want and better than what you had? 198

This question framework is simple enough for anyone of any age to be able to answer,
whether they are a counselor asking a camper, another counselor, or themselves. However,
the first thing one might notice about it is that it is based in the language of wants. For this
reason, it may appear incompatible with virtue ethics, and better aligned with Humean
sentimentalism. This is not the case; virtue ethics are all about developing the virtues of
character such that a person learns to want what is right to want in a given scenario. Like
MacIntyre’s chess-playing child, who learns to love chess for its internal goods, success
counseling is designed to identify what a person wants, then helps to point them toward
what they should want, if they are being virtuous. It is essentially habituation in real life as
opposed to in theory; it is applicable to any practice, whether a person is frustrated with
something their friend did or with their own performance at a given activity. It asks the
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Camp Lanakila, Counselor Manual, 59.
Ibid, 59.

Chapter 4

121

person in question to be reflective about what is truly valuable in a given scenario: internal
goods, which often are the relationships involved, either between that person and another,
or within themselves. Because success counseling uses the language of wants, it is
important that there be a good teacher, particularly for campers, so that they may identify
the internal goods present as opposed to just the external ones, as well as the virtues that
they must exercise to make possible those internal goods. I will address good teaching at
greater length later in this chapter.
This, I believe, is sufficient knowledge of the abstract of success counseling; I shall
now attempt to apply that to a pair of practices at camp to draw the process out in more
specificity and better relate it back to the virtue-ethical framework.
Usually, the first opportunity of the day for success counseling is during Inspection.
This time is infrequently as simple as I portrayed it above. Especially early on in the
summer, and especially for campers who do not usually make their beds or clean up after
themselves at home, Inspection takes some getting used to. Even for campers who have
similar responsibilities at home, it can be difficult to be told to clean up, and to work with
their tent/cabinmates to do it.
Inspection involves a score from 0-100 for the entire tent or cabin, based on scores
of 0-10 across ten different categories. Upon returning from breakfast, campers must each
clean their own areas, as well as the general area of the tent/cabin. For a variety of reasons
(maybe they are sad because they got bad news from home, did not get into their firstchoice activity, or are in an argument with their tent/cabinmates), campers occasionally
would rather sit on their bed than make it, or do anything else. Inevitably, because tents
and cabins are small spaces, other campers notice this behavior, and sometimes will offer
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encouragement, though often will direct ridicule or frustration at the camper who is doing
this. At this point, or before (if possible), the counselor intervenes. Consider the following
interaction, between Jimmy (J), who is an eleven-year-old camper, and his counselor (C):
C:

“Hey Jimmy, what’s going on?”

J:

“Nothing.”

C:

“Well, it’s Inspection time. Yesterday you were cleaning up right now – what’s on

your mind?”
J:

“I don’t want to clean today.”

C:

“Okay, is there something else you would rather be doing”

J:

“I just want some space to sit and read and not be bothered.”

C:

“Do you feel like you’re getting that space now?”

J:

“No, my cabinmates seem annoyed at me, but whatever.”

C:

“Do you think that if you keep sitting there, you’ll get the space you want, so you

can read?”
J:

“I guess not.”

C:

“Okay, so if that’s not working, what do you think you could do?”

J:

“I mean, I could go somewhere else where my cabinmates won’t bother me.”

C:

“What do you think will happen when you come back?”

J:

“I guess my cabinmates will probably still be annoyed because we failed

Inspection.”
C:

“Is that what you want?”

J:

“Not really.”

C:

“If I had an idea for you, where your cabinmates wouldn’t be angry or annoyed

with you, and you would still get your space and time to read, would you be interested in
hearing it?”
J:

“I guess.”

C:

“How about this: I think it might work out that if you help with Inspection and the

Pride Job now, you might get some time before first period starts to have some quiet time
and read. Does that sound good to you?”
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J:

“Yeah, I guess I could do that.”

C:

“Awesome! Thanks, Jimmy! Let’s check in later to see how you feel like this went.”
Through a bit of success counseling, the counselor (and the other campers in the

cabin) and Jimmy get a win-win. 199 The other campers and the counselor get a clean cabin
and a good score on Inspection, and Jimmy gets his space with his book. Of course, there
are probably underlying issues here for Jimmy. The point of the check-in later on is to
figure those out, and to make a plan for the future, as well as talk through why cleaning
one’s area during Inspection is important. If Jimmy is upset, he’s unlikely to be receptive
to philosophical points on the importance of working hard to clean one’s area and
respecting his cabinmates. However, the above conversation did lay the foundation for that.
Jimmy shared that he didn’t want his cabinmates to be annoyed at him. Later, his counselor
can get at some of the reasons underlying this. Most likely, Jimmy wants his cabinmates to
be his friends, but he isn’t ready to share that at the moment, since he is upset. The above
conversation lays the groundwork for the conversation later on, which can then hit on
things like what Jimmy’s relationships with his cabinmates would look like in an ideal
world, or what he wants from his cabinmates and what it means for him to be a good
cabinmate in return.
How does this entail virtue ethics? As mentioned in the abstract, it is a bit like
MacIntyre’s chess and candy example. Initially, it’s important for the counselor to meet
Jimmy where he’s at, to figure out what he wants (to be alone and read), and to help him
understand what he needs to do right then (to help clean the cabin). Later, through a more
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In real life, it is likely that this conversation would have taken a lot longer and involved more twists and
turns, but I think the above conversation gives a good sense of how one of these conversations generally go.
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emotional and intellectual conversation, the counselor can help Jimmy understand the
deeper reasons for keeping a clean cabin, as well as the values of the cabin. So, the first
conversation, which is focused more on external goods, lays the groundwork for a shift to
the internal goods at play, like friendship, satisfaction at a well-made bed, and maybe even
the fun that Jimmy and his cabinmates could have while cleaning up, by making it into a
game, or a singing event, or otherwise. The first conversation opens Jimmy up to other
possibilities, while the second helps him to “change his picture” of how Inspection time
could look if he puts in some work. 200
After Inspection, Pride Jobs 201 offer a similar opportunity, perhaps augmented a bit.
Since the jobs are explicitly for the betterment of the unit, as opposed to Inspection, which
is more easily linked to one’s personal well-being, they are particularly fruitful for
conversations about citizenship in the unit. However, those conversations generally follow
the same framework as the above situation. Both are helped by expectation-setting
conversations had on the first night of the summer, both as a unit and as a tent/cabin, which
help every camper visualized what it means to be a good unit- and cabin/tentmate, as well
as a good friend. They outline how we take care of each other and the space around us, thus
helping constitute the relevant moral tradition.
At Lanakila, one serious opportunity for growth and character-building are Viking
Honors, a system of ranks that campers can achieve by improving and testing their skills
in the departments. The following excerpt from the Counseling Manual gives a good sense
of why these exist:
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“Changing one’s picture” is a common concept at Lanakila, and involves a shift in expectations,
particularly when things do not go our way.
201
These have different names in the different age-group units but serve the same function.
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We also believe that, with the right coaching and encouragement, as we
learn these skills, we can begin to learn larger lessons about ourselves. One
cannot master a tennis serve without learning—however frustratingly— that
failure is a natural, healthy, and positive aspect of growth. We learn that it’s
possible to face our greatest fears as we leap off the zip line platform at the
Ropes Course or off the high dive and into the lake. We learn that boys can
sing and draw and run and play, and that there are many ways to be a man.
We learn that humor helps, hard work pays off, and that the greatest
definition of success has less to do with what we can do than who we can
be: people of courage, integrity, faith, and love. 202
Viking Honors exists so that campers can win “victories over themselves” 203 (Lanakila
literally means “victory” in Hawaiian). These are victories over the little voice in our head
that tells us we cannot do something, over the part of ourselves that believes that voice.
While Viking Honors are external awards, their purpose is more about winning the battle
of self-improvement and the discovery of internal goods.
Imagine a situation in the Swim department: a last-year camper, Jorge, is going for
his second rank (called Tyr 204). He has been working especially hard for a few days on his
Tyr breaststroke, which requires him to swim 50 yards of breaststroke at what is deemed
to be Tyr quality. 205 His kick has been holding him back, as he has struggled to keep his
right foot from doing a little flutter, which is not allowed in breaststroke. Today, he feels
like he can test it, so a counselor watches as he makes it most of the way without messing
up his kick, only fluttering a bit at the end. The counselor (C1) asks Jorge (J1) how he thinks
he did, and Jorge thinks for a bit, before his face sinks.
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Camp Lanakila, Counselor Manual, 69.
Ibid, 69.
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The ranks are (in order): Loki, Tyr, Thor, and Odin. In order to get his Tyr in a department, a camper must
first get his Loki, and so on up the ranks. In order to achieve a full rank (i.e. to be a full Loki, etc.), campers
must achieve that rank across four required departments – Boating, Camp Craft, Exploring, and Swimming
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which has a separate system).
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Tyr quality, as with the other ranks, has certain standards, but generally is based on a camper’s relative
improvement.
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J1 :

“I fluttered again, didn’t I?”

C1 :

“You did, but your arms looked great, and your legs were perfect almost the entire

way!”
Jorge gets out of the lake, and is visibly upset. He has worked for so long on this,
and feels like he cannot figure it out. He goes and sits on the bleachers on the beach. The
counselor goes and sits next to him, realizing that he is crying a bit. They have had success
counseling conversations before, and the counselor knows he does not have to go through
the steps the same way he would with a younger camper. Instead, he gives Jorge some time
to calm down before asking a modified, higher-level set of questions:
C1 :

“When you started working on your Tyr, what did you want?”

J1 :

“I wanted to stand up next to my friends on the Tyr Council. I wanted to be a leader

at camp.”
C1 :

“I remember wanting that same exact thing when I was a camper. What do you

think it means to be a Tyr?”
J1 :

“Well, those are people that are really respected. Other people listen when they talk,

and all the younger campers look up to them.”
C1 :

“I agree, I have a lot of respect for Tyrs. What do you think makes them worthy of

respect?”
J1 :

“I guess they probably had to work really hard to become Tyrs.”

C1 :

“Do you think that meant they failed along the way?”

J1 :

“Probably.”
Jorge, being the smart last-year camper that he is, and having been through these

sorts of conversations since he was eight years old, realizes where this is going. He looks
at the counselor, then makes up his mind. He says, “I need a bit longer to settle my mind,
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but then I want to work on my kick, so that I can get it right and maybe test again tomorrow
or the next day.” 206
Jorge, like Jimmy, realizes a need to change his picture (with the help of a
counselor). Since Jorge is more mature and has more experience with success counseling,
the counselor is able to jump right in with the philosophical conversation that only came in
the second conversation with Jimmy. Because the victory to win is over himself and centers
around how he wants to see the situation (he can either dwell in his disappointment or
realize that he has it within himself to succeed, if he continues to work hard), the counselor
is able to invoke a history of the practice (by referring to the process of previous Tyrs) in
question to help Jorge identify the requisite virtues that it will take to push forward.
So, success counseling at camp is very much like the habituation that Aristotle and
MacIntyre embrace as crucial to their theories, and echoes the lessons that come from
Annas’ skill-building analogy. The underlying theory is that, through challenges that
require the virtues, campers come to learn, understand, and apply those virtues, and realize
the internal goods available from doing so, such as a closer relationship with a counselor,
increased skill, and an appreciation of and belonging to the history and traditions of that
activity. Because these challenges, activities, and practices occur over and over, in different
contexts, campers have ample time to learn and test their acquired virtuous abilities, and
expand those abilities outward from specific practices to their character more generally.
One thing that is absolutely critical to the theory of success counseling is excellent
teaching, à la Annas. Because all of the counselors are trained extensively in the practice,

206

Again, this conversation would probably be considerably more streamlined in real life, but has been
shortened to communicate the essential points.
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and there is a culture of constant improvement at success counseling, 207 the campers get a
consistent approach no matter the activity or situation. Whether a camper is learning to
swim for the first time, challenging their fear of heights on the ropes course, or trying tennis
for the first time, the counselor working with them will use success counseling, helping the
camper identify what they want to achieve, the person they want to be, and take pride in
the courage, determination, and other virtues they demonstrated in experimenting with
something outside of their comfort zone. Integral to the practice of success counseling (and
teaching the virtues) is the relationship between camper and counselor. In the next section,
I explore the way virtuous love is demonstrated and taught at Lanakila.

IV.

A Culture of Virtuous Love
If success counseling is the foundation of Lanakila’s philosophy, then virtuous love

is its cornerstone. Relationships drive Lanakila forward, and make success counseling
possible; because of those relationships, learning becomes enjoyable, a way of building
closeness, trust, and respect between a boy and his counselor. The ethos of love that
Lanakila builds is paramount to campers’ learning and growth. This sentiment is easy to
identify in the 2013 vision piece:
We create a culture that not only recognizes transformation but expects it.
We never give up believing in the goodness, courage, and dignity that we
see in every child—even, and especially, when they fail to see those
qualities in themselves. We provide a community that not only allows its
members to reinvent themselves but that helps and cheers their efforts. Our
camp culture is well attuned to the process of personal reinvention, so

207

It is a practice of their own!
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campers know that they can take their first shaky steps amid the love,
support, and faith of counselors and friends. 208
The process of transforming (building and improving one’s virtues) is a scary one, as there
is no set endpoint or outcome that campers can identify as an end-all, be-all goal. Through
the close relationships that campers develop with counselors and with each other,
transformation and improvement are not only possible, but imminently desirable.
Those relationships make virtuous growth possible in large part because they,
themselves, are characterized by virtuous love. This, too, is easy to find in the intentional
philosophy of the vision pieces (this one from 2012):
Too often we think of relationships as formed by accident or a stroke of
luck. At Lanakila we celebrate those friendships forged by honesty, trust,
and love. We hope to help campers discover and enjoy those close,
vulnerable relationships that know no bounds of age or interest and that help
to shape both who we are and who we want to be. 209
From the day a camper arrives, his counselor take special interest in them, in “his school,
friends, hobbies, favorite books, activities and any other interests or distinguishing
characteristics that are uniquely his own.” 210 Thus, the love directed at each camper is
personal to him, yet characterized by the virtues of honesty, trust, and respect; it is a
virtuous love, an emotional connection fortified and structured by the virtues, exactly as
laid out in the discussion of Wolf in Chapter 3. When a camper arrives at camp, he is
confronted with the loving outlooks of more than 100 counselors; these outlooks lay the
groundwork and serve as a model for him to build his own. So, the culture is designed for

208
"2013 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2013 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2013, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.
209
"2012 Vision Piece," Lanakila Staff 2012 to Parents of Lanakila Campers, June 2012, Camp Lanakila,
Fairlee, VT.
210
Camp Lanakila, Counselor Manual, 21.
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learning and growing in virtuous love, and reflects the framework of the previous chapter
nearly perfectly.
Lanakila offers many different opportunities for boys to discover activities and
relationships that bring them joy, that excite their passion. With counselors who are excited
to share their knowledge and help make camp fun, each boy can experiment with different
departments to discover one (or many) about which he is most passionate. So, a boy can
find and develop his passion quite naturally at Lanakila. This is the first half of my
framework for virtuous love built on Wolf. Lanakila also provides the conditions for
virtuous growth. Counselors help campers discover the internal goods of the practices
about which they are passionate. This leads campers to want to develop in those practices,
not only for the sake of external goods, such as Viking Honors, but for the internal goods
as well. Viking Honors build in the identification and pursuit of internal goods over and
above external ones. Aside from the departments, which focus on specific practices of skills
(and virtues, of course), Lanakila is all about relationships, between tentmates, camper and
counselor, as well as between counselors. The pedagogy stresses that we learn to be our
best, most virtuous selves in concert with those around us. The counseling staff of 2010
corroborates this:
Parents can trust us to … foster relationships grounded in authenticity,
compassion, understanding, and fun. We know that developing the skills to
build and maintain close, vulnerable relationships requires an attentive
network of support; parents can trust us to help their sons communicate
effectively, resolve conflict, and nurture friendships in ways that strengthen
their values and celebrate their wit and whimsy. 211
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This emphasis helps further support the development of virtuous, loving outlooks for
campers and counselors alike. So, Lanakila supports virtuous love in that it provides access
to opportunities to develop love for practices, as well as for other people, while stressing
that those practices and relationships must be supported by the virtues in order to flourish.
Success counseling for relationships is effectively the loving principle of charity in
practice. Whether we are confronting a friend or cabinmate when they’ve done something
we do not like, having a difficult conversation, or resolving an argument, success
counseling asks us to take a step back from our initial emotional reaction, whether we are
eight, 25, or 74 years old. It asks us to take a second to think about the possibilities. Maybe
our friend lashed out at us because they had a tough morning. Or maybe they just failed a
test for their Loki (the first Viking Honor rank) or found out some bad news from their
lives outside camp. The point is, reacting viciously will not help the situation. By
encouraging a longer, more comprehensive, and more reflective view, success counseling
implores us to give ourselves the space to understand ourselves and others, and to respond
in a way that is reflective of love and virtues like patience, humility, and vulnerability.
Because camp is so focused on relationships, opportunities for flourishing are
everywhere. That means that everywhere, the love that campers and counselors must be
structured by the virtues in order for those relationships to flourish. The virtues of camp
give loving relationships their strength, and when we embrace that, we can flourish and
help those around us to do the same. This is pertinent whether a relationship is between a
younger camper and an older one, between two of the same age, between a camper and a
counselor, or between two counselors. Every relationship at camp is special and
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characterized by love. By committing to the virtues and to the act of striving, campers and
counselors help those relationships thrive and last.
Camp Lanakila is a remarkable place. In all likelihood, I have idealized it to some
degree in this chapter; it is, after all, one of the places that has been most influential in my
own life, and one that I will always hold dear. Regardless of whether I have idealized it,
Lanakila serves at the very least as an example of a place where virtue and virtuous love
are aspirationally part of the culture, where striving is built into every activity, every
relationship, and the institution as a whole. It is not perfectly virtuous, but it has identified
virtue as important to its flourishing as an institution, and thereby the flourishing of
everyone who is a part of its community. Lanakila has identified an active philosophy –
success counseling – that integrates skill-building practices with the discovery of internal
goods and the development of the virtues, and embraced a culture of virtuous love that
brings everyone in and further encourages virtuous development and flourishing, together.
In the conclusion to this thesis, I ask a simple question: how can we apply the lessons of
Lanakila in the outside world? What relevance does it have to our everyday lives, most of
which occur outside of summer camp?

Conclusion: Taking Camp into the World
I.

A Call to Action
At the end of every summer, there is an event called Final Council Fire. Because it

is one of the most special events at Lanakila, I will not describe it further than to say that
it is a time for reflection on the lessons, challenges, and triumphs of the summer, and for
looking forward to returning to the outside world. In the spirit of the conclusion of the
summer and the beginning of the rest of the year, the director gives a sort-of call to action,
in which he asks all of the campers and counselors to take those lessons into the outside
world. He asks everyone to remember that people are deserving of love and virtuous
treatment not only in the camp environment, but everywhere else, too. In a way, it is the
ultimate invocation of the narrative unity of a human life. The virtues learned at Lanakila
do not stop having worth once the summer ends, but rather, are all the more important in
outside-world situations that do not expect them or make them easy to exercise. The
internal goods that come from engaging in practices and relationships do not go away in
the outside world; every lesson from Lanakila can be applied in one’s life outside of camp.
The director is really asking everyone to work to bring the selves they embody at camp
into the world, and to spread the lessons of Lanakila to the places that need them. The
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purpose of this conclusion will be similar to the director’s call to action. In it, I attempt to
answer the question, “How can we take the lessons of Lanakila into real life?”

II.

What Makes Camp Effective?
Lanakila is a place designed such that a young boy may come to a place where he

will experience love and virtuous development around the clock, no matter the situation.
This is one of the characteristics that makes camp unique: it is one of the few places that
exists where, at least for three-and-a-half or seven weeks, a philosophy may pervade every
part of a person’s life. Most of our lives are not like this: we wake up at home, go to school
or work, and go home, creating at least two distinct environments in most people’s lives;
moreover, on weekends, many of us participate in other, distinct communities: religious
groups and sports teams are a couple of examples. Life at camp provides consistency of
approach, whereas life outside of camp, most of the time, consists of very different
situations and parts of our lives. It is easier to apply virtue when that is the continuous ethos
that pervades one’s interactions, and when virtuous love abounds; this serves to the point
of the second chapter that situations do matter. So, one thing that makes camp effective at
teaching the virtues and practicing virtuous love is that it provides a consistent
environment.
But, as I have argued, what gives virtues their worth and strength is that they are
applied readily no matter the environment; they are not limited to one part of our lives or
another. Does camp ensure this? The simple answer is: it cannot ensure virtuous action
outside of camp, since we do not have counselors in our everyday lives, nor are we
surrounded by people who practice the same philosophy we do. However, camp is
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importantly about building the tools for success: it strives to be, as the 2017 vision piece
says, a “launchpad” experience instead of a “pinnacle” one. 212 If it were only the latter, it
would be failing at its mission of “helping create fine people,” because those people would
be unable to apply what they had learned about themselves and about the virtues in their
lives outside the camp. This is where the intentionality of teaching the philosophy comes
in. There are a few manifestations that reaffirm this philosophy, some of which I have
already mentioned and others not.
The first is the work put in by counselors and leadership alike to set and emphasize
values from the first day. The vision piece is an affirmation of this, and since it is sent out
to parents, they form an expectation that those values ring true in their campers, as well as
coming to appreciate those values themselves, if they do not already. This sets the
philosophical course for the summer and holds counselors accountable to that course.
Second is the system of feedback at Lanakila. Because the camp places an emphasis
on striving toward its best self and likewise on each person striving towards their best self,
there is a culture of giving and receiving feedback from each other and ourselves about
how we are doing our jobs. This is codified formally in that each department and unit has
set feedback sessions at the beginning and end of the summer, as well as other times
scattered throughout. There is a counselor meeting once a week that serves as a
reaffirmation of the themes of the summer, as well as a time to check in with each other
and oneself about how things are going. This ethos is also informally pervasive in that one
norm is constant check-ins with one’s unit or department head, as well as with oneself.

212
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Thus the culture and structure of camp is such that people are constantly reinforced both
internally and externally in their commitment to virtuous action and love.
Every Sunday, there is a nonreligious gathering in the woods during which all of
Lanakila – campers and counselors – get together to share in one of the camp’s quieter
traditions. At Sunday Gathering, there is singing, which often focuses on the more
meaningful pieces in the Song Book, as well as a talk given by one of the counselors. These
talks focus on a theme of camp that has been influential for that counselor – mindfulness
on the Appalachian Trail and coming to appreciate the application of Lanakila’s values in
inner city Atlanta are a couple of examples – and work to make that talk salient for the
campers. They often involve a skit, which serves as a parable that supplements the talk
itself, and helps make the talk relatable for the campers (these frequently involve a mix of
humor and moral development). Sunday Gatherings help the entire camp to come together
and reaffirm its shared virtues; each camper and counselor walks away with the possibility
of applying what they have learned in their camp lives that week. Furthermore, it is a direct
manifestation of the virtuous love that the camp community embraces and embodies. It
involves open signs of affection – smiles, laughter, hugging, singing together, and
sometimes dancing – and a sense of deep, meaningful joy.
Success counseling is one of the most important manifestations of this; since it is
used every day, in almost every teaching interaction, it pervades campers’ and counselors’
consciousness. Success counseling teaches everyone who participates in it to ask
themselves questions like: “If I were being patient (or courageous, or loving, or
conscientious) right now, how would I handle this situation?” Success counseling gives
everyone the tools to think about what is really important in a situation (its internal goods),
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and how to get that, while being virtuous in the way one goes about pursuing those goods,
especially in one’s relationships with others and oneself. Success counseling is the most
important everyday tool that campers and counselors learn that helps them become the best
versions of themselves throughout their lives, throughout the year, throughout very
different situations. It is the backbone of Lanakilans that guides them as they make their
way through their lives, at camp and in the outside world.
These are some of the many events and tools that Lanakila emphasizes over the
course of the summer. Some are simple and everyday; others are high-level and more
spread out. The two different levels work together to help Lanakilans’ commitment to the
virtues and virtuous love become part of their lives outside of camp; the director’s call to
action is a synthesis of this. It emphasizes the greater philosophical message – camp’s telos
(to use Aristotle’s term): that we all have a responsibility to be virtuous and loving as much
as we can in our lives both at and outside of Lanakila; Lanakila is a gift that each of us
receive and it is on us to bring that gift with us into the world. The call to action also
grounds that philosophical message in the work that it takes – which is a lot – to be virtuous
and loving in our everyday goings-on. This is the application of the lessons we have learned
in moments of triumph and challenge; the director calls on us to remember the way we
handled those situations, and to work to do the same when we go home, wherever home is.
This is what makes Lanakila effective at the teaching of the virtues and of virtuous love:
it, and everyone in it, commit to a culture built on the shared telos of the camp, while also
putting that telos into action in every interaction, small or large, external or internal. It
successfully matches the philosophical with the practical, and embraces a commitment to
improvement. So, if other organizations are to successfully teach the virtues, they must do
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the same: they must identify the virtues they hold dear formally, through the structure of
the organization as well as its guiding documents, as well as informally, through culture;
they must commit to those virtues and strive to put them into practice every day. This is no
small task, and calls for a radical restructuring – the transformation – of many of the
institutions that are important to our lives, as well as of our own mindsets.

III.

Challenging Convenience: A Second Call to Action
Lanakila is a definitively anti-convenience place, where campers and counselors

are actively encouraged to shift their focus away from outcomes and onto the processes by
which we achieve those outcomes, or fail to do so. Lanakila embraces the struggles of being
human, of working to transform oneself and one’s relationships so that they become more
virtuous and more loving. Lanakila emphasizes practices, internal goods, and the virtues
necessary for them, however imperfectly packaged those things come. Lanakila
intentionally opts for things that seem outmoded, like the shooting, developing, and
printing of film photography, creation of physical art and woodwork, and stories told from
memory, precisely because they require patience, courage, and thought, and often result in
imperfect outcomes. These things are difficult, and involve practices that, by their
definition, can always be improved upon.
They are also things that can be and are made easier: photography on a digital
camera often results in dazzling photos, chosen from among thousands of takes, touched
up to perfection on a computer; art and woodwork can be digitized, so that a line is
automatically straight, or a curve perfectly mimics reality; stories are told on the screen
that induce jaws to drop, make us cry, and invite us into breathtakingly beautiful landscapes
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we may never know. Let me emphasize that these are good things. They bring joy and
beauty and awe to more people than ever before, and this is an emphatically good thing.
What I have tried to emphasize in this thesis, however, is that the practices that challenge
us, that put us to work and induce reflection, that cause us to question outcomes and endure
discomfort, in the name of growth and virtuous development, are often the ones that allow
us to flourish. By engaging with these struggles, not only will we learn how to better handle
other situations that challenge us or go in a way we would never have planned, but we also
learn how to find meaning in a world of increasing convenience.
It is unlikely that the trend toward convenience will slow anytime soon (and in
many ways that is a good thing!), so it is imperative upon each of us and the institutions in
which we take part to understand that flourishing still relies on processes, not outcomes. In
a way, convenience offers us a new lens through which we may reframe the questions
central to virtue ethics. Virtue ethics implores us to ask questions like, “What is the good
for me? For this relationship? For this institution (work, school, play, etc.)?” Convenience
has the potential to hijack these questions, by emphasizing what is easy and fast, but we
need not let it. When we focus on the virtues, these questions become: “How can I grow,
so that I become more patient, more thoughtful, and more self- and others-aware? How can
I help this relationship grow, so that it becomes closer, more loving, and more resilient
when things go awry? How can I help this institution grow, so that it becomes more
inclusive and welcoming, more fun, and more conducive to the growth of all of its
members?”
This sort of approach already exists to varying degrees in many places. We can see
it in schools that adopt growth-mindset curricula, where teachers help students question the
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idea that intelligence is set, and as a result unlock their potential as improving learners.213
It exists to some degree in B Corporations, which focus on “[creating] benefit for all
stakeholders, not just shareholders,” thus pushing themselves past the pursuit of profit to
the protection of our planet and our communities. 214 It exists when religious leaders,
politicians, entertainers, intellectuals, and other influential public figures call on us to be
more loving toward each other. Critically, though, as I have emphasized over and over
again in this thesis, such an approach must include a basic commitment to the virtues. It
must emphasize patience, humility, courage, thoughtfulness, and justice, among the many
others, if it is to truly help us flourish. It cannot be focused on outcomes, as utilitarianism
is, nor on strict imperatives, as Kantian ethics is. If it is, it will fail to connect with us as
humans, and fail to emphasis the process by which we grow, with which virtue ethics is so
closely concerned.
Virtue ethics in practice is not constrained to Camp Lanakila, nor should it be. This
thesis has emphasized the way that virtue ethics can be learned: through a focus on the
discovery of goods internal to practices and on the virtues that make those internal goods
accessible; in virtuous, loving relationship with ourselves, with our practices, and with
those around us. In it, I have endeavored to show that learning and applying the virtues is
possible no matter what one’s life situation, that being born wealthy or poor or somewhere
in between has no bearing on whether or not someone can strive toward virtue and thereby
flourish. Moral traditions define what we are brought up thinking is right, and virtue ethics
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"Growth Mindset: The Science," The Growth Mindset - What Is Growth Mindset - Mindset Works,
accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.mindsetworks.com/science/.
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"B Corporation," The B Corp Declaration, accessed April 21, 2018, https://www.bcorporation.net/whatare-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration.
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embraces that; while it does not condone moral relativism, it postulates that there is always
improvement to be had. We can always become more virtuous (patient, humble, etc.), no
matter our social positionality, identity, education level, or income.
What virtue ethics requires, more than anything else, is that we try. It helps to have
good teachers, but virtue ethics does not necessarily define who those teachers are. In
reality, we are all teachers and students simultaneously. Because each of us is different,
some of us tend to be more patient, others more determined, and still others more
courageous. We can all learn from each other and become more virtuous all the time. The
math teacher may learn from their pupil a different way for looking at a problem, the
running coach from the high school runner a new motivational strategy, the partner at an
investment firm a more sustainable, equitable approach to investments from the associate.
That being said, there are tangible things to be done to make the virtues more
accessible, specifically to children. While it is not the task of this thesis to detail them all,
I will outline a related pair of ideas. First, we should work to increase communication and
involvement between schools and families, as well as engaging in collective vision-setting;
this will allow parents to gain a greater understanding of and say in their children’s
education, as well as helping teachers to better understand the parents’ needs and interests;
this is the shared work of setting a high-level philosophical course that Lanakila does so
well. Second, we should work to develop more experiential, practice-based learning,
wherein teachers help students to focus on the goods internal to that practice; this is the
everyday groundwork that underlies the learning of the virtues that Lanakila is able to do
in its departments. These are not easy fixes, and will require a concerted, coordinated effort,
but educators, parents, and children would do well to push for them.
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We live in a world of ever-increasing convenience, what virtue ethics requires is
not that we reject that convenience wholesale, but rather be aware of its impact on our lives,
and dedicate ourselves to the sometimes-inconvenient practices that help us grow and
flourish as people. When we focus on the virtues and the internal goods they beget, no
matter who or where we are, we unlock a world of potential within ourselves to become
better, more flourishing, more loving people. When we do this, we embrace the power of
our relationships to become better, more flourishing, and more loving. When this is the
basis of our relationships with each other, those relationships pervade the structure of our
institutions and push them forward to create a better, more flourishing, more loving society.
This is the promise of virtue ethics: a society more committed to universality than
the Kantian categorical imperative could realistically achieve, with greater, more equitable
overall happiness than a utilitarian utopia. When a society flourishes, it can embody these
characteristics without any of the alienation; a flourishing, virtuous society is full of the
love we hold so dear, that binds us together, and helps make our lives meaningful. Each of
us can take Lanakila with us into our lives, whether or not we have been, or even heard of
the camp before reading this. So, at the next opportunity, try something inconvenient: learn
a song on a musical instrument; build something out of wood or Legos or even sand on the
beach; go take a hike in a place you’ve never been before; or have a conversation with
someone you know about something you’ve never talked with them about before. Try to
approach it with enough patience and courage to see it all the way through, without rushing,
and pay attention to the internal goods that come of the process. You never know: you just
might fall in love with that little bit of inconvenience; if you do, remember the virtues that
made that love possible.

Appendix
1. A counselor congratulates a camper learning to swim.

Photo courtesy of Jenn Grossman, Jenn Grossman Photography ©
2. A counselor helps a camper with measurements in the woodshop.

Photo courtesy of Jenn Grossman, Jenn Grossman Photography ©
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3. Campers sing in the Barn during Assembly

Photo courtesy of Jenn Grossman, Jenn Grossman Photography ©
4. Campers paddle across a lake in canoes.

Photo courtesy of Jenn Grossman, Jenn Grossman Photography ©
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5. Arch every camper walks underneath onto the swimming dock, proclaiming one of
Lanakila’s mottos: “There are many ways to be a man.”

Photo courtesy of Jenn Grossman, Jenn Grossman Photography ©
6. Bob’s Song, “Love Changes Everything,” in Songs of Lanakila.
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